University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations

University of Connecticut Graduate School

6-22-2016

Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental
Economics
Sining Wang
sining.wang@uconn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Wang, Sining, "Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics" (2016). Doctoral Dissertations. 1235.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1235

Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Sining Wang, PhD.
University of Connecticut, 2016
Abstract
The focus of this dissertation is to understand how mental rules of thumb, cognitive biases,
and individual differences can lead judgments and decisions to systematically deviate from the
theoretical “optimal” choices. The first essay examines how a decision-maker’s subjective belief is
determined by her risk preference in a coordination game. We conduct a laboratory experiment
where the participants played a repeated, fixed-partner stag-hunt game. In the experiment, we
elicited the participants’ subjective belief, risk aversion and cautiousness levels. Here, we confirm the
findings from past studies that suggest that the traditional measure of risk aversion in economics
cannot explain people’s behavior. Additionally, we find that the psychological concept of
cautiousness plays a key role in determining the origin and the evolution of the decision-maker’s
belief. Specifically, we find that cautiousness affects the way people form the mental representation
of their partners. A decision-maker with a higher cautiousness level is less likely to believe that her
partner will choose the risky option. When the stag-hunt game was played repeatedly, a high
cautiousness level prevents the decision-maker from updating her belief effectively, and
consequently impedes cooperation between the players. The second essay proposes and
experimentally tests the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance associated with the context plays a key
role in determining people’s decisions in economic experiments. We conduct a laboratory bribery
game experiment where the cognitive dissonance levels are controlled using different treatments
(familiar-context treatment, unfamiliar-context treatment, and context-free treatment). With the aid
of an independent attitude survey, we find that people in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the
context-free treatment experience the same cognitive dissonance level; meanwhile, we do not
observe different behavior in the lab. We also find the familiar-context treatment triggers the most
intensive cognitive dissonance level among all treatments where the subjects are much less likely to
behave unethically. Our theory is able to unify the mixed results from past studies on the
experimental context effects. In the third essay, using a unique data set from a sample of recent local
college graduates in China, we investigate the effect of agreeableness on the respondents’ starting
salary and perceived career satisfaction level. Results from our analyses indicates that agreeableness
positively predict women’s starting salary. This effect is highly robust to change in model
specifications. However, agreeableness does not impact the men’s starting salary. Our result here
suggests that non-cognitive ability (such as personality traits) plays a vital role in determining labor
market outcome. In addition, we find that agreeableness positively related with subjective jobsatisfaction level. But this result is not robust to changes in model specifications. When we add the
respondents’ major as a control variable, the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes
negligible and not statistically significant. This result might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing
major. Further examination is required to explore this possibility.
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Overview of the Dissertation
Most modern economic theories were conceived as normative models of an idealized “rational”

decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of real humans. However, accumulating evidence
suggests that some of the most basic rules of economic theories are commonly violated. The deviations
of actual behavior from the normative models are “too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to

be dismissed as random error and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative
system” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). The focus of my dissertation is to understand how mental

rules of thumb, cognitive biases, and individual differences can lead judgments and decisions to
systematically deviate from the theoretical “optimal” choices.

The Role of Risk Aversion and Cautiousness in Belief Formation is the first chapter of my dissertation.

In this paper I investigate belief formation and decision-making in a coordination game. Past studies

on coordination game have looked at how institutional changes impact the outcomes of the games, but
have ignored the importance of subjective belief and the role of individual characteristics. In this study,

I argue that to fully understand the decision-making mechanism, it is essential to investigate how
individual differences in risk preference influence the decision-maker’s subjective beliefs. Specifically,

I demonstrate that in a coordination game, a decision-maker’s subjective belief is determined by her
risk preference. I conducted a laboratory experiment where the participants played a repeated, fixed-

partner stag-hunt game. In the experiment, I elicited the participants’ subjective belief, risk aversion
and cautiousness level. While the traditional measure of risk aversion in economics cannot explain

people’s behavior just as past studies suggested, I find that the psychological concept of cautiousness
plays a key role in determining the origin and the evolution of the decision-maker’s belief. More precisely,


I find that cautiousness affects the way people form the mental representation of their partners. A
decision-maker with higher cautiousness level is less likely to believe that her partner will choose the

risky option. When the stag-hunt game was played repeatedly, high cautiousness level prevents the

decision-maker from updating her belief effectively, and consequently impedes cooperation between
the players.

In the second chapter of my dissertation titled A Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation of the Context

Effect in Economic Experiments: Evidence from a Laboratory Bribery Game, I aim to make contributions
on experimental methodology. Specifically, this paper examines how experimental context affects

people’s decision using the paradigm of a bribery game. Cognitive dissonance level evoked by engaging

in dishonest practices was manipulated by different experimental instructions. More precisely, the

same experimental task was presented to the student subjects with three different instructions: one
with familiar-context instruction, one with unfamiliar-context instruction, and the other with context-

free instruction. In line with past studies, I do not find essential different outcomes in the unfamiliarcontext treatment and the context-free treatment. In contrast, I find that the student subjects are much

less likely to engage in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment. In addition, students who
engaged in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment required more monetary compensation

to justify for their decisions. Integrate results obtained from a separate attitude survey, I propose that

the familiar experimental context amplifies the cognitive dissonance of engaging in dishonest practices,
prevents them from behaving unethically.

The Premium for being a Nice Person: Agreeableness and Career Success Level in the Initial Career

Stage constitutes the third chapter of my dissertation. In this paper, I apply the insights gathered
from the laboratory experiments and the psychology literatures to investigate important issues in


labor economics. Using a unique data set from a sample of recent local college graduates in China,
we investigate the effect of agreeableness on the respondents’ starting salary and perceived career

satisfaction level. Results from our analyses indicates that agreeableness positively predict women’s
starting salary. This effect is highly robust to change in model specifications. However, agreeableness

does not impact the men’s starting salary. Our result here suggests that non-cognitive ability (such as
personality traits) plays a vital role in determining labor market outcome. In addition, we find that

agreeableness positively related with subjective job-satisfaction level. But this result is not robust to

changes in model specifications. When we add the respondents’ major as a control variable, the effect
of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes negligible and not statistically significant. This result

might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing major. Further examination is required to explore this
possibility.



Essay 1
The Role of Risk Aversion and Cautiousness in Belief Formation
1. Introduction
In a variety of social environments, people must decide whether to engage in mutually beneficial but
risky cooperation with others. Cooperation is risky if it leads to losses when not reciprocated. Many
authors have examined how the structure of payoffs and subjects’ risk aversion impact decisions in
these environments (Cooper et al.,1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990; Russell et al, 1992; Carlsson and Van
Damme, 1993; Harsanyi, 1995; Selten, 1995; Straub, 1995; Battalio et al.,2001; Schmidt et al.,2003;
Chaudhuri et al., 2010; Roos and Nau, 2010). However, the origin and evolution of beliefs about others’
behavior has received much less attention. In this study, we experimentally examine whether the
economic concept of risk aversion or the related psychological construct of cautiousness, a personality
trait, can explain a decision-maker’s subjective beliefs about her partner’s action in a repeated staghunt game.
Consider the game in Figure 1 in which players independently decide between Red and Blue. The
game has two pure-strategy equilibria: a payoff-dominant equilibrium [Red, Red] and a risk-dominant
equilibrium [Blue, Blue]. While the payoff-dominant equilibrium is Pareto optimal, playing red is
risky as coordination failure [Red, Blue] will result in an inferior outcome. Therefore, a player’s optimal
strategy depends on the player’s beliefs about the likely strategy of her partner.
As a typical case of risky cooperation, the stag-hunt game has attracted a lot of attention in the
last two decades. Cooper et al. (1990) showed that variations in a player’s payoff from an opponent’s

play of a cooperative strategy influences equilibrium selection. Battalio et al. (2001) and Dubois et
al. (2011) showed that in repeated stag-hunt games, the increase in the expected earning difference
between the two strategies made the subjects pay more attention to results from previous periods.
Consequently their strategy selections converged to the equilibrium outcomes more rapidly. Schmidt
et al. (2003) showed that changes in risk-dominant equilibrium payoffs are more likely to influence
behavior than changes in payoff-dominant equilibrium payoffs. Chaudhuri et al. (2010) showed that
a recommendation to play the payoff-dominant equilibrium is successful in resolving coordination
failure. These studies examine how institutional changes impact outcomes in games, yet none provide
an explicit decision-making mechanism. Yet, the findings from these studies suggest the importance of


These equilibrium notions are defined by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).



examining belief formation and coordination. For example, Chaudhuri et al. (2010)’s study shows that
manipulating beliefs changes outcomes, while results in Battalio et al. (2001), Yoshida et al. (2010),
and Dubois et al. (2011) imply that the evolution of the subjective beliefs affect people’s behavior.

Recent experimental studies have also investigated the relationship between risk preference and
strategy selection in stag-hunt games (Neumann and Vogt, 2009; Buyukboyaci, 2012; Al-Ubaydli et
al., 2013). To our knowledge, only null findings have been returned, finding (perhaps paradoxically)
little relationship between risk aversion and behavior. However, the calculation of an optimal strategy
entails not only risk but also beliefs (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Rey-Biel, 2009). These past studies use
various proxies for beliefs, such as the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or the proportion of people
selecting a particular strategy.
We propose that the decision-maker’s subjective belief concerning the other player’s action is the
key to understanding the decision-making mechanism in these contexts. The subjective belief should
be understood as the outcome of one’s heuristics and reasoning, and therefore potentially widely
heterogeneous. In order to reveal how people make decisions, we directly elicit subjective beliefs and
investigate where these beliefs come from.

While past studies focus exclusively on the economic concept of risk aversion to measure risk
preference, we introduce the psychological construct of cautiousness (Moss, 1961). Wearing a seatbelt,
skydiving, and taking social risks, are often decisions based not on carefully-calculated weighing of
risks and rewards, but reflect an innate personality trait (Levenson, 1990; Trimpop, 1994; Lauriola
and Levin, 2001; Weber et al., 2002; McDaniel and Zukerman, 2003; Breakwell, 2007). Both risk
aversion and cautiousness relate to how people react to uncertainties, yet they are essentially different
from each other in two aspects. First, whereas the estimated risk aversion reflects the change in the
decision-maker’s gratification level toward possible gains only, the cautiousness measure assesses
the decision-maker’s attitude toward potential negative outcome. Second, whereas the risk aversion
measure concerns isolated individual decisions, the cautiousness measure concerns people’s thoughts
and actions in social interaction situations. We find that cautiousness (but not risk aversion) helps
explain subjects’ beliefs—and therefore actions—in a stag-hunt game.
1.1. The Source of Subjective Beliefs in the Coordination Game

In the first period of a fixed-partner repeated game, the decision-maker will make her prediction
without any information about her partner’s characteristics. Under such circumstances, how can she
effectively “predict” what her partner will do? We propose a simple heuristic: she will first establish a
mental representation of her partner based on her own personality traits, and then predict what the
“imaginary partner” will do. In particular, a decision-maker who has low risk-tolerance might project


the same characteristic on to her partner, and consequently predict that her partner is unlikely to take
the risky action. To put it in another way, the decision-maker expects that her partner will choose the
same strategy as she does. In the first period of the stag-hunt game, the decision-maker’s reasoning
would be “my partner must do the same thing as I do, otherwise she is crazy.” This type of reasoning is
known as the “Stackelberg heuristic”.
The concept of “Stackelberg heuristic” was coined by Colman and Bacharach (1997). The essential idea
of it is that “both players in a game choose strategies that maximize their own payoffs on the assumption
that any choice will invariably met by a counter strategy that maximizes the co-player’s payoff, as if the
co-player could choose second in a perfect information version of the game with foreknowledge of the
first player’s choice” (Colman and Stirk, 1998). Substantial evidence have shown that the Stackelberg
heuristic is commonly used by individuals. From the decision making literature, many past studies have
observed the fact that people employ the Stackelberg heuristic to solve problems where the outcome
depends on social interactions. For example, Eells (1984), Nozick and Rescher (1969), Quattrone and
Tversky (1984), Nozick (1994), Camerer (2003), Jeffrey (2004) found that people often make decisions
by maximizing the conditional expected value of possible acts rather than the pure expected utilities
as in the traditional theory. From the psychology literature, the phenomenon that people’s estimates
of behaviors or attitudes of others are often positively related to their own behaviors or attitudes has
been repeatedly observed and intensively investigated (see Hoch, 1987, as an example). In short, in
the first period of the game, risk preference directly influences the decision-maker’s subjective beliefs
about her partner’s strategy selection. Specifically, risk-tolerance levels positively associate with the
probability of believing one’s partner will take the risky option. Behaviorally, lower risk-tolerance level
will lead the decision-maker more likely to select the safe option.
As the decision-maker plays the stag-hunt game with the same partner repeatedly, she would update
her belief according to the results from previous periods (Erev and Roth, 1998; Neumann and Vogt,
2009). To explore how risk preference affects the evolution of the subjective beliefs, we employ a
particular feedback mechanism in which the strategic uncertainty can only be eliminated when the
two players in a pair play the risky option simultaneously. Specifically, the decision-maker observes the
payoffs she earned in each period, and then infers her partner’s action. For a decision-maker who has
chosen Blue, her payoffs do no vary with the other person’s choice. That is to say, she can only see what
her partner did if she has chosen Red. Feedback on the other person’s action is not available if she has
chosen Blue . If the decision-maker were able to observe the other person’s action in any case, then one
way to achieve the payoff-dominant equilibrium is to send my partner a signal by choosing the risky
option. Such behavior would make the subjective beliefs irrelevant. Our feedback mechanism prevents
signaling. A decision-maker with lower risk-tolerance level is less likely to choose Red. Accordingly,
she is also less likely to observe her partner’s action. Thus, the strategic uncertainty remains as long


as one of the two players selects the safe option. If only one player has chosen Red, the coordination
failure is still not observable to the one who has chosen Blue. Such undesired outcome creates further
confusions between the two players, prevents them from achieving the payoff-dominant equilibrium.

In summary, we put forward that risk preference plays a central role on explaining the origin and
the evolution of the decision-maker’s subjective belief. In the first period of the game, risk preference
affects the way people form the mental representation of their partners; consequently, risk-tolerance
level positively correlate with the probability that believing one’s partner will choose the risky
option. When the decision-maker plays the stag-hunt game with the same partner repeatedly, low
risk-tolerance level would hinder the elimination of strategic uncertainty, which in turn, impeding
cooperation between the players.
1.2. The Operational Definition of Risk Preference

Economists generally conceive of risk preference as reflecting the shape of one’s utility function.
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) introduced the concept of risk aversion as a quantitative measure
for individual risk preference. Based on this idea, economists typically use lottery games to elicit the
decision-maker’s risk aversion level in laboratory experiments. For instance, Eckel and Grossman
(2008) introduced a lottery game that contains a series of lotteries, each lottery is associated with
a particular risky level. The lotteries are given to the participants in ascending order by their risk
levels. The participants choose one lottery among all the lotteries to play. By observing their lottery
selections, the experimenter will then assume a particular utility function form (for example, constant
relative/absolute risk-averse utility function) and estimate the participants’ risk aversion levels. Other
examples include Hey and Orme (1994), Pennings and Smidts (2000), Holt and Laury (2002, 2005).

Within the psychology literature, cautiousness, as a personality trait, is seen as an indicator of one’s
preference toward risk. Howard A. Moss (1961) proposed “Cautiousness is regarded as the tendency
to behave in a manner designed to avoid potential failure or disapproval experiences, and this goal is
achieved often at the expense of other satisfactions. That is, the cautious person is more concerned
with avoiding failure than with obtaining success. In order for cautiousness to be observed, there must
be a basis for judging certain response alternatives as entailing less risk and less potential satisfaction
than other alternatives”. Operationally, cautiousness is measured using personality inventories. For
example, the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999) has a sub-dimension to assess
people’s cautiousness level.
The first conceptual distinction between risk aversion and cautiousness is that they understand
“uncertain outcome” in quite different ways: whereas risk aversion considers the uncertain outcome
as possible utility increase, cautiousness considers the uncertain outcome as potential event that may


lead to potential negative or disapproval experience (Knowles et al. 1973; Sitkin ans Weingart, 1995;
Gasper and Clore, 1998). Such dissimilarity makes cautiousness a better measure for the decisionmaker’s risk preference in the stag-hunt game. In our game, the main factor that prevents people from
choosing the cooperative action is the fear of not being reciprocated. According to the definition of
cautiousness, a decision-maker who has a tendency to avoid potential disapproval experience will
give away the cooperative option and choose the safe option, as the safe option entails no risk of
coordination failure. The risk aversion measure cannot capture the decision-maker’s attitude toward
such potential negative outcome.
The second distinction between risk aversion and cautiousness is that they make different assumptions
about the decision making environment: whereas risk aversion is constructed under the assumption
that each decision-maker will make the decision on an isolated island and will not be concerned about
other people, the cautiousness is constructed under the assumption that the decision-maker will think
through her actions in a social interaction situation. These differences may make cautiousness a more
apt measure of risk preference in interdependent situations. Fischer and Smith (2004) and Nicholson
et al. (2005) found empirical evidence that cautiousness negatively correlates with the tendency of
involving in risky social activities. To measure cautiousness, we use the average of a five item subset
of the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), (Goldberg, 1999). Subjects indicate their agreement
with statements (such as “I choose my words with care”) on a 5-point Likert scale. In the current study,
we measure individual risk preference using both risk aversion and cautiousness. We employ the Eckel
and Grossman (2008) lottery game to estimate risk aversion.

2. Experimental Design and Administration
The experiment was conducted at the University of Connecticut in the fall of 2013. Participants
were recruited from the undergraduate student population via a recruitment notice in a universitywide “Daily Digest” email. In total, 50 undergraduates (34 women and 16 men) participated in the
experiment over seven sessions of between six and twelve participants each. The experiment lasted
about an hour including check-in and payment processing. Participants earned “points” through the
experiment which were converted into cash at the conclusion of the experiment at a rate of $1 for
every five points earned. Average earnings were $15.18, including a $5 show-up fee.

The experiment consisted of three parts: (1) a ten period repeated coordination game with a fixed
anonymous partner, (2) a survey of cautiousness, other personality factors, and demographics, and (3)
(1-r)


Formally, we assume that the participant would have a constant relative risk aversion function as U(X)=X
/(1-r), where x denotes the
expected payoffs from the lottery game. Accordingly, an extremely risk aversion participant would be characterized as r→∞. This lottery game only
concerns about individual’s risk aversion level, and does not incorporate a risk-seeking range. See Eckel and Grossman (2008) for more detail.



a risk-elicitation procedure.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two separate rooms upon arrival. Each participant
randomly picked an experimental ID and was paired with another participant with the same ID number
in the other room. Participants were introduced to the coordination game represented in Figure 1 (see
Appendix for instructions) and then interacted with the same partner for 10 periods. In each period,
prior to making a selection, participants first made predictions about what their partners would do
(Red or Blue), and indicated how certain they were about their predictions by selecting a number
between 0 (not certain at all) to 100 (completely certainty). For example, a participant can indicate a
belief that the other participant will play Red, and a 30% certainty. A participant can also indicate a
belief as “No idea” if she has no clue about what her partner might do. We employ the binarized scoring
rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013) algorithm to make truth-telling an optimal strategy.
After making both the prediction and the selection, the experimenter informed each subject privately
of their payoff. Since payoff does not vary with partner’s strategy when one selects the safe strategy
(Blue), participants could infer their partner’s action only when playing the risky strategy (Red). This
feedback mechanism rules out potential signaling behavior (i.e., if one selects the risky option in any
period of the game, she will receive the feedback on her partner’s action in that period. On the opposite
side, if one selects the safe option in any period of the game, she would not know her partner’s decision
in that period). The game was repeated for ten periods. At the end of this part, one of the ten periods
was randomly selected by rolling a ten-sided die to determine participants’ payment for this part. The
outcome in the randomly selected period determined how many game points the participant earned
for his or her decision and prediction in this part.
Next, participants completed a survey including a 30 question subset of the International Personality
Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999). The 30 questions, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale, measure
six personality traits with five questions each. The personality traits include our cautiousness
measure, as well trust, altruism, compliance, competence, and achievement-striving, offering some
controls for alternative motivations in risky coordination games. Additionally, the survey elicited
demographic information, including sex, age, nationality, and education (see appendix for the complete
questionnaire).

Lastly, participants completed a lottery game to measure risk aversion. The lottery is an extended
(eight option) version of the procedure designed by Eckel & Grossman (2008). Participants selected
from among eight different binary lotteries, each with two equally possible (50%) outcomes. The
riskiness of the eight lotteries is ascending ordered with higher expected value associated with higher


See the experiment instruction in appendix for more detail.



variance. After selecting a lottery, one of the two outcomes was randomly selected by rolling a die with
the outcome determining the participant’s payment for this part of the experiment. A major advantage
of the Eckel and Grossman (2008) procedure is its simplicity, with 50/50 gambles being quite intuitive,
and with easy-to-calculate expected values.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 shows the percentage of individuals and pairs playing the risky option [Red] over time. In
the first period, 64% of individual participants played the risky option whereas 36% played the safe
option. By the last period, 84% played the risky option whereas 16% played the safe option. In terms
of pair behavior (Table 1): in period 1, 48% of pairs achieved the payoff-dominant equilibrium (RedRed) by playing the risky option simultaneously, whereas 20% of pairs achieved the risk-dominant
equilibrium (Blue-Blue). In the last period, 80% of pairs played the payoff-dominant equilibrium,
whereas 12% pairs played the risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects changed strategies fairly often in
the first four periods, but little changing occurred between periods 5 and 9. Some end-game effects
were observed in period 10. In general, observed behavior is similar with that observed in Al-Ubaydli
et al. (2013)’s experiment.
Table 2 shows measures of risk aversion from the risk elicitation procedure. The measure of risk was
calculated by assuming a constant relative risk aversion function. Table3 shows descriptive statistics of
the cautiousness measurement and other personality variables. Each personality variable is formed by
averaging the five Likert scale items and subtracting 3, so that each ranges from -2 to 2. Figure3 shows
the scatterplot of risk aversion against cautiousness. The two measures seem largely uncorrelated
(Pearson’s product-moment correlation = 0.170, p=0.25, Spearman’s rank correlation= 0.20, p = 0.16,
Kendall’s rank correlation= 0.16, p = 0.13).
Result1: The risk-averse and cautiousness measures are independent from each other.

This result is consistent with our discussion of the differences between risk aversion and cautiousness,
as they are measuring different aspects of how people react to uncertainties
3.2. Subjective Beliefs and Decision Making

A primary research question concerns the origin of participants’ beliefs. Accordingly, we examine
predictions in the first period, prior to any interaction between the participants. Figure 4 shows

There are also other complex measures for risk aversion that might provide more refined estimates of the parameters in the utility
function (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1992; Hey and Orme, 1994; Holt and Laury, 2002; Barron and Erev, 2003.)––but the trade-off of a refined
estimate is the increased complexity of the task.  When the participants are confused by the complex task, we will see more noise in the result.
Dave et al. (2010) found that failing to account for noisy behaviors (or errors) may bias the estimation of risk aversion parameter significantly.
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the distribution of participants’ predictions in the first period. Whereas only 6% (3/50) indicated
that they have no idea about their partners’ actions (by reporting a certainty of 0%), 62% (31/50)
participants predicted that their partner will choose the risky option (Std.Dev. = 17.12), and 32%
(16/50) participants predicted their partners will choose the safe option (Std.Dev. = 22.34).

We find that there is a clear connection between the participants’ prediction and their decision in
the first period of the game. Specifically, participants’ decisions almost always match their prediction
of their partner’s play regardless of the certainty level that they have reported (Table 4). Among
participants who predicted that their partners will play red, 96.77% (30/31) of them also selected red,
among participants who predicted their partners will play blue, 100% (16/16) of them also selected
blue. This is in line with Neumann et al. (2009), who also found that the majority of the participants
chose the strategies that were consistent with their stated first-order beliefs.
Result 2: Subjective belief determines strategy selection independent of the certainty level.

This result is consistent with our discussion on the role subjective belief played in decision making.
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the stag-hunt game is to play the Red with a probability of 0.75
and to play the Blue with a probability of 0.25. If the confidence level were to translate into probability
and then serve as the base of decision-making as the expected-utility theory predicted, a risk-neutral
decision maker will not play red unless she is at least 50% sure her partner will play red. Obviously, the
externally determined probabilities cannot explain the underlying decision-making mechanism.
3.3. Origin of subjective beliefs

In section 1.1, we hypothesized that in the first period of the game, participants will make predictions
using Stackelberg heuristics. Evidence from the experimental data suggests it is the cautiousness, rather
than the risk aversion, that serves as the basis of such a heuristic. We first use the median value of the
risk-averse measure to split the sample and find no significant difference between beliefs of the two
groups (Table 5). Specifically, about the same proportion of risk-averse individuals (16/26=61.5%)
and risk-seeking individuals (15/24=62.5%) believe that their partner will play the risky option in the
first period. (Fisher exact test p=1.0). Conversely, a median split along the cautiousness measure shows
marginally significant differences in predictions (Table 6). Less cautious individuals are more likely to
believe that their partner will choose the risky option (19/26=73%) (Fisher exact test p=0.14).
To further examine the relationship between one’s risk aversion/cautiousness and subjective belief
in period 1, we use a probit model to predict the binary prediction (red=1, ignoring certainty) as a
function of the risk aversion measure and cautiousness measure, controlling for other personality
traits and demographic factors (Table 7). We also use an OLS model in which the dependent variable
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is the overall certainty that the partner will play red, measured from -100 (certain partner will play
blue) to 100. Lastly, for comparison, we also offer a probit regression on the participant’s first period
choice rather than prediction.

According to table7, the estimated parameters on risk aversion on all the three regressions indicate
the risk aversion measure, has negligible, statistically insignificant effects on the participants’ binary
prediction, precise prediction and decision. This result is consistent with findings from past studies
(Neumann and Vogt, 2009; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013, Büyükboyaci, 2014). Contrarily, the cautiousness
measure has a large, statistically significant effect on the participants’ binary prediction and decision.
The more cautious is a subject, the more one believes that the partner, too, is cautious in the sense
that the partner is more likely to play the safe strategy, blue. In addition, we notice that both the risk
aversion measure and the cautiousness measure have statistically insignificant effect on the certainty
level of prediction.
Result 3: The traditional measure of risk aversion cannot explain individual subjective belief
and strategic selection in the first period of the game.
Result 4: The psychological concept of cautiousness correlates with one’s belief that the partner
will play the safe option in the first period of the game.
3.4. Evolution of beliefs
In this section, we first look at how the participants update their subjective beliefs based on the
outcome of the prior period. Results are summarized in table 8. For participants who played the risky
option and ended up with the payoff-dominant equilibrium, 98% of them selected the risky option
in the next period. It is clear that once the two participants in a pair played cooperatively together,
the strategic uncertainty between them was eliminated immediately. However, for participants who
played the risky option but ended up with a bad outcome (i.e., red-blue), 46% of them predicted that
the partner would switch to the red in the next period. That is to say, strategic uncertainty led to
variation in next period’s beliefs.
To examine whether risk aversion/cautiousness plays a role in explaining the evolution of people’s
subjective beliefs, we again use median splits, and classify participants as either more risk-seeking
individuals or more risk-averse individuals. Accordingly, we identify three different types of pairs
of partnered subjects: risk-seeking pairs (both participants are risk-seeking individuals), mixed
pairs (one risk averse and one risk seeking participant), and risk-averse pairs (both are risk-averse
individuals). We use the same method based on cautiousness to classify pairs as cautious pairs, mixed
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pairs, and less-cautious pairs. Table 9 shows for each type of pair the proportion of periods in which
different equilibria were achieved. On aggregate, 81.43% of risk-averse pairs and 88.33% of the riskseeking pairs achieved the payoff-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test p = 0.3343). 7.14% of riskaverse pairs and 3.33% risk-seeking pairs achieved the risk-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test
p =0.4503). Figures 5 and 6 show the proportion of pairs achieving the payoff-dominant equilibrium
or risk-dominant equilibrium over time for each of the two groups. When we use the risk-averse index
to mid-split the sample, we cannot observe any clear pattern over time. Therefore, we again confirm
the findings from past studies who find that risk aversion does not explain individual behavior in this
game.

When we use the cautiousness index to identify the pairs, we find 60% of the cautious pairs
and 90% of the less-cautious pairs achieved the payoff-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test,
p<0.0001). Additionally, 25% of the cautious pairs and 2.85% of the less-cautious pairs achieved the
risk-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test p = 0.0002). Figures 7 and 8 show that 100% of the
less-cautious pairs eventually achieved the payoff-dominant equilibrium (none of them achieved the
risk-dominant equilibrium). For the cautious pairs, only 60% of them achieved the payoff-dominant
equilibrium and 40% achieved the risk-dominant equilibrium. As we discussed in section 1.1, since
cautious individuals are less likely to attempt the risky option in the early periods of the game, they
will also less likely to update their beliefs based on positive feedback. As a consequence, the strategic
uncertainty between the two players in a pair would impede them from cooperation. Observations
from the experiment supported our conjecture.
Result 5: The traditional measure of risk aversion cannot explain individual subjective belief
and strategic selection in the repeated game.
Result 6: The psychological concept of cautiousness negatively associates with the probability
that one achieve the payoff-dominance equilibrium.

4. Conclusion
This paper seeks to provide insight into how individual characteristics influence one’s decision
making in a social cooperation environment. Specifically, we investigated how risk preference affects
people’s subjective beliefs in a repeated coordination game. Moreover, in most past studies, the decisionmaker’s risk preference was often solely defined by the constant relative risk aversion. Accordingly,
the only measure of risk preference was one’s selection in certain lottery games. In this study, we
explored another aspect of risk preference beyond the traditional risk aversion measure. Integrating
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insights gleaned from personality psychology with the literature on decision making, we put forward
that cautiousness plays a key role in determining the decision-maker’s subjective belief formation and
strategy selection.

We designed and conducted a laboratory experiment to test this idea. In the first part of the experiment,
the participants played a simple coordination game with fixed partners over ten periods. In each period,
the participants made a selection between a safe option and a risky option. In addition,
we also elicited the participants’ beliefs by asking them to make predictions on their partners’ possible
actions. We employed the binarized scoring rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013) to provide incentive to
report one’s subjective belief truthfully. In the second part of the experiment, we used a subset of the
International Personality Item pool (Goldberg, 1999) to measure the participants’ cautiousness level.
In addition, we also assessed some other personality traits that might affect decisions in the game.
Following the personality survey, the participants were asked to complete a demographic survey. In
the last part of the experiment, we used the Eckel and Grossman (2008) lottery game to elicit the
participants’ risk aversion, as in many past studies.
Based on the data generated from our laboratory experiment, results from previous studies are
replicated: the risk aversion measure cannot explain the participants’ behavior in the simple
coordination game. Nevertheless, evidences that are original from this paper suggest that cautiousness
influences the participants’ subjective beliefs and decisions through two mechanisms: 1. in the first
period of the game, cautiousness affects the way a decision-maker forming mental representations of
her partner. Higher score on cautiousness leads the decision-maker more likely to believe her partner
will play the safe option. Behaviorally, cautiousness negatively associates with the probability of playing
the risky option. 2. in the repeated game, since higher score on cautiousness makes the decision maker
less likely to try the risky option in early periods of the game, she would not have enough feedbacks
to update her subjective belief effectively. Consequently, the uncertainty concerning her partner’s next
move would make her less likely to achieve the payoff-dominance equilibrium.

There are several limitations to the current study that ought to be addressed in future work. First,
whereas an experimental design that does not have feedback to the participants who have chosen the
safe option, it does not capture the full picture of belief formation and strategy selection. One-shot
game design and random-partner design could be helpful extensions of this study. Second, it is also
worth to take other popular measures of risk preference (e.g. Zukerman sensation seeking, Domainspecific Risk-taking scale, Impulsiveness in the big five. etc) into consideration, as we are still far from
achieving a sophisticated understanding on how individuals think, feel, and act under uncertain
situations. Third, as in most past studies, the lottery game we used in this study was designed on the
base of expect-utility theory, regardless of the fact that many experimental studies have shown that
human decision making under uncertain situations are systematic deviations from the prediction of
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the expected-utility theory (Loewenstein et al. 2001). A possible alternative is to measure the decisionmaker’s risk preference using instruments that are designed relying on prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Mishra et al., 2012). For example, Barron and Erve (2003) and Abdellaoui et al.
(2008) are all possible candidates.

Our investigation contributes to several literatures. Our findings contribute to decision making
literature in that we emphasize not only on strategy selection, but also on the importance of subjective
judgment during decision making. We contribute to the behavioral game theory literature, by examining
how individual characteristics, especially risk preference, influence the equilibrium selection in a
repeated coordination game where multiple equilibria could be recognized simultaneously. We identify
cautiousness as an important, but previously unexamined, aspect of risk preference that affects the
game outcome. Our work also speaks to the learning literature by demonstrating how cautiousness
affects the way people react to past experiences, which have not been directly investigated in a
coordination game context.
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Appendix A. Tables and Figures

Table1. Detailed descriptive statistics in each period
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10
Percentage of Individual
Select the Red

0.64

0.86

0.74

0.84

0.82

0.86

0.84

0.84

0.78

0.84

Percentage of Pairs
Achieve the Red-Red

0.48

0.72

0.60

0.76

0.76

0.80

0.76

0.84

0.76

0.80

Percentage of Pairs
Achieve the Blue-Blue

0.20

0.00

0.12

0.08

0.12

0.08

0.08

0.16

0.20

0.12

Table2. The descriptive statistics of the estimated risk aversion
Lottery
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Payoffs

Prob.

$6.0

50

$6.0

50

$7.6

50

$5.2

50

$9.2

50

$4.4

50

$10.8

50

$3.6

50

$12.4

50

$2.8

50

$14

50

$2.0

50

$15.6

50

$1.2

50

$17.2

50

$0.4

50

Risk*

CRRA**

Selection

0.00

r>2.5

3 (6%)

0.28

0.96<r<2.5

5 (10%)

0.57

0.75<r<0.96

9 (18%)

0.85

0.54<r<0.75

9 (18%)

1.13

0.41<r<0.54

3 (6%)

1.41

0.31<r<0.41

13(26%)

1.70

0.22<r<0.31

3 (6%)

1.98

r<0.22

5 (10%)

# of Observations = 50, Standard Deviation = 2.02
Male = 16 (32%), Female = 34 (68%),
*Risk is measured as standard deviation of expected payoff.
** Assuming a contant relative risk avere utility function U(X)=X

(1-r)

/(1-r)
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Table3. The desriptive statistics of the personality survey
Variable

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

No. items

Cautiousness

0.28

0.64

-1.40

1.40

5

Trust

0.63

0.50

-0.90

1.60

5

Altruism

1.28

0.56

-0.40

2.00

5

Compliance

0.72

0.67

-0.60

2.00

5

Competence

1.12

0.59

-0.60

2.00

5

Achievement

1.24

0.68

-0.80

2.00

5

Table4. Subjective beliefs determine strategy selection
Select Red

Select Blue

Believe my partner
will select Red

98.25%

6.32%

Believe my partner
will select Blue

1.75%

93.68%

# of Observations

401

95

Table5. The estimated risk aversion cannot explain the predictions in period
Subjective beliefs in period1
predict Red
predict Blue or No Idea
# of Observations

Risk-averse
16 (61.5%)
10
26

Risk-seeking
15 (62.5%)
9
24

Table6. Less-cautious indiviuduals are more likely to predict the risky option in period 1
Subjective beliefs in period1
predict Red
predict Blue or No Idea
# of Observations

Risk-averse
12 (50%)
12
24

Risk-seeking
19 (73.7%)
7
26
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Table7. The cautiousness explains the origin of the subjective belief
(1)

(2)

(3)

Probit

OLS

Probit

Predict The Other
Person Will Play Red
(dummy, predict red =1)

Range from -100 (blue for
sure) to +100 (red for sure)

0.06

3.76

0.15

(0.11)

(4.96)

(0.11)

-0.95***

-22.31

-1.02***

(0.38)

(15.98)

(0.41)

0.41

30.24

0.68

(0.48)

(21.18)

(0.52)

-0.05

-1.07

-0.15

(0.40)

(19.70)

(0.46)

0.36

7.65

0.67*

(0.38)

(20.53)

(0.37)

0.23

6.32

-0.16

(0.63)

(32.45)

(0.65)

0.36

9.84

0.67*

(0.33)

(15.11)

(0.36)

0.99*

38.67

1.14*

(0.58)

(25.87)

(0.62)

-0.01

0.97

-0.23

(0.28)

(13.94)

(0.27)

-0.17

-8.40

0.07

(0.30)

(14.44)

(0.31)

-0.40

-41.03

3.12

(0.54)

(60.21)

(3.55)

0.18

0.19

0.24

Observation

50

50

50

Robust Std. Error
(cluster on individuals)

YES

YES

YES

Model
Dependent Variable
Risk Aversion
Cautiousness
Trust
Altruism
Compliance
Competence
Achivement-Striving
Male (dummy)
Age
Education
Constant
Pseudo R-sqaure

Precise Predictions

Play Red
(dummy, play red=1)

            ***p < 0.01, **p<0.005, *p<0.1
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Table8. Positive feedback effectively eliminate strategic uncertainty
Positively
Feedback
(Red-Red)

Negatively
Feedback
(Red-Blue)

Believe my partner will
select Red in the Next Period

97.83%

45.95%

Select Red in the Next Period

96.60%

51.35%

# of Observations

324

37

Table9. Less-cautious pairs are more likely to achieve the payoff-dominant equilibrium
Mid-split participants with Risk aversion

Mid-split participants with Cautiousness

Risk Averse Pairs

Risk Seeking Pairs

Cautious Pairs

Less-Cautious Pairs

% of pairs achieved
Red-Red

81.43%

88.33%

60%

90%

% of pairs achieved
Blue-Blue

7.14%

3.33%

25%

2.85%

# of Observations

7 x 10

6 x 10

6 x 10

7 x 10
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Figure1. The Stag-hunt game
Player 2

Player 1

Red

Blue

Red

60, 60

0, 45

Blue

45, 0

45,45

Figure2. Percentage of individuals/pairs select the risky option
90%

% of Individuals Playing Red

80%
% of Pairs achieving Red-Red

70%

60%

50%
1

2

3

4

5

6
P eriod

7

8

9

10

Figure3. The estimated risk aversion and the cautiousness are not correlated
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Figure4. Subjective beliefs in period1 are highly polarized
P ercent

20

15

10

5

0
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Certainty
No Idea
Certainty

Figure5. The estimated risk aversion cannot
explain why people coverge to Red-Red

Figure6. The estimated risk aversion cannot
explain why people coverge to Blue-Blue

Proportion of Pairs
Achieved the Red-Red Equilibrium

Proportion of Pairs
Achieved the Blue-Blue Equilibrium
Risk-Seeking Pairs

100%

80%

RS pairs=6
RA pairs=7

60%

80%
Risk-Averse Pairs

60%

40%

40%

20%

Risk-Averse Pairs

RS pairs=6
RA pairs=7

20%

Risk-Seeking Pairs

0%
1

2

3

4

5

6
P eriod

7

8

9

10

Figure7. Less-cautious pairs are more likely
to converge to  Red-Red over time
Proportion of Pairs
Achieved the Red-Red Equilibrium
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Figure8. Cautious pairs are more likely
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Less-Cautious Pairs

100%

Proportion of Pairs
Achieved the Risk Red-Red Equilibrium
80%

80%

Cautious Pairs

60%

40%

60%

Less-Cautious pairs=7
Cautious pairs=6

40%

Cautious Pairs

20%

Less-Cautious pairs=7
Cautiuos pairs=6

20%

Less Cautious Pairs

0

1

2

3

4

5

6
P eriod

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

6
P eriod

7

8

9

10

24

Appendix B. Experiment Instruction

Experiment Instructions
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions under uncertain situations. The
experiment will be done on papers. You each have a printed copy of the instruction. I will now read the
instruction in front of you.
Today’s experiment will take approximately 60 minutes. You will finish three different parts through
the experiment.
If you pay attention and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. Just for
showing up, you have earned $5. All earnings for today’s tasks will be in addition to the $5. You will
earn “Points” through the experiment. At the conclusion of the experiment, you will be paid $1 for
every five points you earned. The more points you earn the more monetary payment you can get. At
the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings privately and in cash. You will not be paid if
you leave before you conclude the experiment.
There are three parts to today’s experiment. In part 1 and part 3, the choices that you make will
determine your earnings. However, you will only be paid the earnings that correspond to one of the
two parts. At the end of the experiment, I will flip a coin to determine which of these two parts will be
used to determine your earnings. You will have the same chance of being paid for each of these two
parts. There is no direct payment for part 2.
There are some cards in this box. Please pick one randomly. The number on that card will be your
EXPERIMENT ID.
For the remainder of this experiment, please refrain from any communication with other participants.
Please put away your cell phones.
When you finish reading the above material, please wait for others. When everyone is ready, we will
distribute and read through instructions for part 1.

Part1:
Introduction to the procedures:
In this part, you will be paired with one other participant. Each of you will be matched with another person with the same
ID number as you in the other room. You will interact with the same person over 10 rounds. In each round, you will make a
choice between two actions—either Red or Blue.
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 If you select Blue, then you earn 45 points regardless of what the other participant selects.
 If you select Red, then:


If the other participant also selects Red, then both of you earn 60 points;



If the other participant selects Blue, then you will earn 0, and the other participant will
earn 45 points.

In addition, in each round, you will make a prediction about the other participant’s selection, and indicate how confident
you are in your prediction. For example, you can indicate “I think the other participant will select Red, and I’m 30% sure
about this.” You would indicate this prediction by drawing a vertical bar on the picture below (on your answer sheet):

The other participant faces exactly the same decision and earnings. You will interact with the same person over 10 rounds.

How you will be paid in Part1:
At the end of this part, one of the ten rounds will be randomly selected to determine your payment.
A. Payment for your decisions
After you finish all the ten rounds, I will roll a ten-sided die to decide which round will be used to determine your
payment in this part. The outcome in the randomly selected round will determine how many points you earn for your
decisions in this part.

B. Payment for your predictions
Your payments for the predictions depend on three things: 1.you prediction, 2.the other participant’s choice, 3. a random
number from 0 to 100%.
You will earn 5 points if:

•

Your prediction is correct with a sufficient large confident level.

• Your prediction is wrong with a sufficient small confident level. You
will loss 5 points if:
•

Your prediction is correct with a sufficient small confident level,

•

Your prediction is wrong with a sufficient large confident level,

Define vector

and

:

If you report red with a positive confidence level p, then

.
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If you report blue with a positive confidence level p, then

.

If you predicted red correctly, then you earns 5 points if  
number k; otherwise you loses 5 points.

is smaller than the random generated

If you predicted red wrongly, then you still earns 5 points if  
number k, otherwise you loses 5 points.
If you predicted blue correctly, then you earns 5 points if
generated number k; otherwise you loses 5 points.
If you predicted blue wrongly, then you still earns 5 points if
generated number k, otherwise you loses 5 points.

is smaller than the random generated
is smaller than the random
  is smaller than the random

Effectively, one important thing I want to remind you is that telling the truth when reporting your
prediction is optimal.
When you finish making prediction and decision in each round, please hand in your answer sheet to the
experimenter. We will match your answer with the other participant’s, record the other participant’s answer
on your answer sheet, then give the answer sheet back to you. You will find out the other participant’s
decision in that round. You will then proceed to the next round. In short, the procedure in each round is as
follows:

After you finish all ten rounds, I will roll a ten-sided die to decide which round will be used to determine your payment
for this part. When everyone has finished all ten rounds, we will move to part 2.

When you are finished with these instructions and are ready to proceed, please start to make your
prediction and decision for Round 1.
Part2
Please answer the questions carefully and truthfully. We guarantee that we will treat these surveys with
the utmost confidentiality. I will now read the instruction  in front of you.
This part contain phrases describing people’s behaviors. Please indicate for each statement whether it is:
1.


Very Inaccurate,
Q6, Q12, Q18, Q24, and Q30 are questions toward cautiousness. Q24 and Q30 are reverse-scoring questions.
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2.

Moderately Inaccurate,

3.

Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate,

4.

Moderately Accurate

5.

Very Accurate

as a description of you.
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as
you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly
your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner.
STATEMENTS
Q1:

I believe that people are basically moral

1

2

3

Q2:

I complete tasks successfully 1

2

3

4

5

Q3:

I make people feel welcome 1

2

3

4

5

Q4:

I am easy to satisfy

1

2

3

4

5

Q5:

I go straight for the goal

1

2

3

4

Q6:

I avoid mistake

2

3

4

5

Q7:

I believe that others have good intentions

1

2

Q8:

I excel in what I do

2

3

4

5

Q9:

I anticipate the needs of others

1

2

1

1

Q10: I can’t stand conforntations

1

2

3

Q11: I work hard

3

4

5

Q12: I choose my words with care 1

2

3

1

2

4

5

3

4

5

3

4

5

4

5

4

5

5
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Q13: I trust what people say

1

2

3

4

5

Q14: I handle tasks smoothly

1

2

3

4

5

Q15: I love to help others

1

2

3

4

5

Q16: I hate to seem pushy 1

2

3

4

5

Q17: I turn plans into actions

1

2

3

4

5

Q18: I have a reserved and cautious attitude toward life

1

2

3

Q19: I suspect hidden motives in others

1

2

3

4

5

Q20: I don’t understand things

2

3

4

5

Q21: I make people feel uncomfortable

1

2

3

4

5

Q22: I Insult people 1

4

5

Q23: I am not highly motivated to succeed 1

2

3

4

5

Q24: I do crazy things

4

5

Q25: I believe that people are essentially evil

1

2

3

4

5

Q26: I don’t see the consequences of things

1

2

3

4

5

Q27: I take no time for others

1

2

3

4

5

Q28: I hold a grudge

2

3

4

5

Q29: I put little time and effort into my work

1

2

3

4

5

Q30: I often make last-minute plans

2

3

4

5

2

1

1

1

3

2

3

1

4

5
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Part 3. In this part, you will select from among eight different lotteries the one lottery you would like to
play. The eight different lotteries are listed below. You must select one and only one of these lotteries.
To select a lottery, place an X in the appropriate box.
Each lottery has two possible outcomes (ROLL LOW or ROLL HIGH) with the indicated probabilities
of occur. Your compensation for this part of the experiment will be determined by which of the eight
lotteries you select; and which of the two possible outcomes occur. For example, if you select Lottery
4 and ROLL HIGH occurs, you will win 54 points. If ROLL LOW occurs, you will win 18 points. For
every lottery except Lottery 1, each ROLL has a 50% chance of occur. At the end of this part, you will
roll a ten sided-dice to determine which event will occur. If you roll a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, ROW LOW will
occur. If you roll a 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10, ROLL HIGH will occur.
When you are finished with these instructions and are ready to proceed, please make your lottery
selection with an X in the last box across from your preferred lottery. When you finish the selection,
please notify me. You will then roll the die. After that, I will pay your earnings privately and in cash.
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Essay 2
A Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation of the Context
Effect in Economic Experiments:
Evidence from a Laboratory Bribery Game

1. Introduction

Formulating experiment instructions without a specific context has been the mainstream practice

in the community of experimental economics, as many researchers are extremely concerned about

potential data distortion caused by the connotations of a background story (see Lowenstein, 1999, for

a detailed discussion). The rich literature has examined whether or not the context of an experiment
affects people’s behavior (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr et al., 1997, Abbink et al., 2006), but little

consensus has been reached. Despite conflicting findings from past studies, the underlying reason that
leads to those controversial findings has received little attention. In this paper, we try to identify the
potential mechanism through which the context affects people’s decisions in economic experiments.

Within the experimental economics literature, a commonly used method to study the context effect is

to put a decision-maker in a position where he or she must decide whether to engage in economically
rational but dishonest practices (see Bardhan, 2006, for a brief review). Under such circumstances,
concerns about the moral obligation that is entailed in the experimental context might potentially

change people’s behavior. Representative examples include Cooper et al. (1999), Barr et al. (2003),
Abbink et al. (2006), Bardhan (2006), Barr and Serra (2009), and Armantier and Boly (2014).
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Mixed evidence has been found in past studies, and it seems that the experimental context affects

subjects’ behavior in unpredictable ways. On one hand, many studies have shown that the experimental

context does not affect people’s behavior (c.f. Table 1). Cooper et al. (1999) conducted a ratchet

effect experiment in which the authors compared subjects’ decisions in an abstract context and a
concrete context. They found that changing the experimental context had no effect on the student

subjects’ behavior. Cooper and his colleagues conjectured that student subjects did not understand
the connotation involved in the concrete context, as they had no “expertise” that was relevant to the

context. Barr et al. (2003) conducted an embezzlement experiment with both abstract and concrete

contexts. They also found that both contexts deliver the same results. Abbink et al. (2006) conducted a
bribery game experiment with two different versions of instructions, one with neutral descriptions and

words and the other with suggestive words. They found no difference in people’s behavior. Accordingly,
Abbink et al. (2006) conjectured that subjects will understand the experimental task by relying on the
essential features of the task, rather than the suggestive words. Barr and Serra (2009) conducted
another bribery game with both abstract and concrete contexts. In line with Abbinn et al. (2006), they

found that various contexts had no impact on the bribee’s behavior. The authors conjectured that since
the bribees in the game did not have similar experience in their lives before the game, they would hardly

understand the meaning of their choices. Armantier and Boly (2014), conducted a bribery game with
two concrete contexts but different framings. They found that framing the bribe as either bonus or

penalty did not change people’s behavior. Their explanation was that people’s intrinsic motivation
 In Cooper et al. (1999), the concrete context was framed as interactions between “manager” and “worker”.
 In Barr et al. (2003), the concrete context was framed as interactions between “health worker” and “community
members”.
 In Abbink et al. (2006), the concrete context was framed as interactions between a “firm” and a “public officer”. To
secure permmision to run an industrial plant which produces pollution, the firm can bribe the officer to influence the
grant decision.
 Barr and Serra (2009) implemented the bribery game in a one-shot pitty game. The concrete context was framed
as interactions between “public servant” and “citizen”.
 In Armantier and Boly (2014), the interaction was framed as interactions between firm manager and employee.
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is identical across treatments. All the above example studies have shown evidence that supports the
opinion that context does not affect behavior in laboratory experiments.

On the opposite side, a considerable amount of evidence has shown that even the slightest change

in experimental context can dramatically affect people’s decisions in social preference tasks (c.f. Table
2). Eckel and Grossman (1996) conducted a dictator game with two treatments. The two treatments

only differed in that in one the recipients were labeled as more “deserving.” The authors found that
people tend to increase donations when the experimental context implies that the donation goes

to a “deserving” recipient. The authors conjectured that context affects behavior by changing the
perception of “fairness.” Cooper et al. (1999) found that changing the context affects subjects who are

actual managers in real life. The authors conjectured that since those subjects had relevant “expertise”
in their real lives, a concrete context made them more sensitive to an unethical decision. Laury and

Taylor (2008) compared how the same individual makes decisions inside and outside the lab in a public
good contribution setting. They found that people’s behavior in the lab cannot predict their decision
Table1. Evidence that support the opinion that context DOES NOT affect behavior
Study

Basic Setup

Finding

Conclusion

Cooper et al. (1999)

Ratchet effect
experiment

Experimental context
only has minimal
impact on student
subjects’ behavior

Student subjects do not have
“expertise” for the task.

Barr et al. (2003)

Embezzlement
experiment

Abstract context and
concreate context
deliver the same result

The subjects in different
treatments have very similar
backgrounds.

Abbink et al. (2006)

Bribery game
experiment

Even heavy loaded
experimental context
does not change
people’s behavior

The subjects will only
understand the experimental
task by its essential feature.

Barr and Serra
(2009)

Bribery game

varied contexts had no
impact on the bribees’
behavior

The subjects who played
as the “bribree” do not have
similar experience before

Armantier and Boly
(2014)

Bribery game

Framing the bribe
as either “bonus” or
“penalty” does not
change behavior

The “intrinsic motivation” are
in different treatments are
identical
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even in very similar social preference tasks. Laury and Taylor conjectured that people’s behavior in an
abstract context does not reflect their actual preference in reality. Barr and Serra (2009) found that

various contexts affect the briber’s behavior dramatically. The authors argued that the concrete context
elicited the subjects’ intrinsic motivation, which was essential in determining bribery behavior.

All of these attempts from both sides contributed to the heated and ongoing methodological debate,

but a comprehensive interpretation of the underlying reasons of the context effect is still rare. In this
paper, we incorporate insights gleaned from social psychology into economic experiments, and look
for a fundamental interpretation of the context effect. We will show that experimental context and

subject’s pre-game experience jointly influences decision making in a systematical and predictable
way. We propose that a familiar decision-making context leads subjects to link the experimental task

with their pre-game experiences. Consequently, the familiar-context amplifies subjects’ emotional
stress of engaging in corruption, and makes them unlikely to behave unethically.

Table2. Evidence that support the opinion that context DOES affect behavior
Study

Basic Setup

Finding
people tend to increase
donation when the context
infers that a donation goes
to a “deserving” recipient.
Context affect the manager
subjects’ behavior.
laboratory behavior cannot
predict subjects’ behavior
in similar social preference
tasks with essential
feature.

Conclusion

Eckel and Grossman
(1996).

Dictator game

Cooper et al.(1999).

Ratchet effect
experiment

Laury and Taylor
(2008).

Public good
game

Capterner et al.
(2008).

Dictator game
with different
subjects

systematic differences
between the choices of
students and community
members

student behavior is not very
representative

Alatas et al. (2009).

Bribery game

public servants are much
less likely to involve in
dishonest practice

Public servant subjects have similar
real-life experience

Barr and Serra
(2009).

Bribery game

Context affect the briber’s
behavior

Their behaviors are driven by
“intrinsic motivation”

Context affect how people perceive
“fairness”.
Managers have “expertise” for the
game. The expertise changes their
perceptions of the game.
People’s behavior in the lab
may not necessarily reflect their
preference.
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Most people hold a positive view of themselves (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In general, they

consider themselves to be “moral, honest, and decent” individuals (Aronson, 1999; Mazar et al., 2008).
This positive self-concept prevents them from behaving unethically (Manley et al., 2001). Actions that

violate moral obligations or certain social standards invoke an aversive state, as the dishonest practice
is inconsistent with the positive self-concept. Such aversive state is known as cognitive dissonance in

social psychology (E. Aronson, 1992) . A key element that determines the intensity of the dissonance

is personal involvement—the more attention one devotes to the unethical decision, the greater the
dissonance (Mojzisch et al., 2006) experienced. As Aronson suggested:

“...cognitive dissonance theory makes its strongest and clearest predictions when the self-

concept of the individual is engaged. That is, in my judgment, dissonance is greatest and
clearest when it involves not just any two cognitions but, rather, a cognition about the self
and a piece of our behavior that violates that self-concept” (Aronson, 1960, 1992).
Figure1. The Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation
If the experimental context makes the subjects link
their self-concept with the decision-making situation?

No

Yes

context does not
affect behavior

context does
affect behavior

Examples:
evidence in
Table1

Examples:
evidence in
Table2

 The cognitive dissonance theory was first proposed by L.Festinger (1957). It has been one of the most influential theories in the field of
social psychology (Aronson, 1999). See Harmon-Jones and Harmon-jones (2007) for a brief review of the history of the theory.
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Returning to the study of experimental economics, an artificial context that is closely related to a

subject’s pre-game experience orients the subject to associate the hypothetical scenario with his or her

self-concept. Subjects will be more engaged in the task and devote more attention to their decisions.
Accordingly, the cognitive dissonance evoked by dishonest practices (and their consequences) are
magnified by the familiar interactive environment. Behaviorally, subjects are less likely to engage in

dishonest practices. On the other side, an experimental context that is distant from pre-game experience
leads subjects to be unattached to the task. The lack of personal involvement makes it easier to find
external justifications for a dishonest practice. To escape from the aversive state and strive for self-

consistency, the reasoning would be: “This is just a game, I will not do that in real life” (although the
subject had no similar experience in real life) or “I’m curious about what the consequences are for
choosing this; let me try it out.”

With this insight, we will review the findings from past studies. Abbink et al. (2006) reported that

variations in experimental contexts did not change subjects’ behavior in their bribery game experiment.

The authors conjectured that the subjects understood the task based only on the essential feature
of the bribery situation. However, there is an alternative explanation for their finding: The cognitive
dissonance levels evoked by dishonest practices were the same in the two treatments. Accordingly, the

subjects behaved in the same way. Barr and Serra (2009) found that higher negative externalities were
associated with less dishonest practices. This finding can be seen as indirect evidence that supports
our cognitive dissonance interpretation, as higher negative externalities may also evoke more intense
dissonance for the person who behaves unethically.

From past studies, we learned that a subject is less likely to engage in corruption when his or her

experimental role is the same as the real-life identity (Cooper et al., 1999; Atalatas et al., 2009). In the
 In Barr and Serra (2009), negative externality was defined as decreasing in monetary payment of a third party due to the corrupt activities.
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current study, we put forward that familiarity with the identity is a special case of familiarity with the
context. As discussed earlier, the pre-game experience here is not limited to subjects’ real-life identity.
Rather, it is an integration of one’s real-life role, expertise, knowledge, worldview, and all factors that

contribute to the individual’s self-concept. As long as a subject is familiar with the context, he or she will

link the experimental task to pre-game experiences. Subsequently, the subject will be more sensitive
to behavior that violates his or her self-concept (a positive self-concept for most people).

Alatas et al. (2009) performed a corruption game experiment with Indonesian public servants and

Indonesian students as two separate subject pools. They found significant differences in the behavior
of the public servant and the student when each participated in the same bribery game framed as
an interaction between firm manager and public servant. Specifically, they reported that the public
servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance for corruption. Barr and Serra (2009) also argued

that subjects’ real-life identity triggers the intrinsic motivation to abstain from an immoral decision.

Here, we will first confirm this finding. Additionally, we propose that the intrinsic motivation in Barr

and Serra (2009), on a fundamental level, is the need for self-consistency. To put it in another way, in
a familiar decision-making context, people will abstain from an immoral decision to avoid cognitive

dissonance that may threaten their positive self-concept (Lindzey and Aronson, 1985). We will use a
laboratory experiment to show that cognitive dissonance which is manipulated by the experimental
context influences a subject’s decision—even in situations where the role he or she plays in the
experiment differs from the real-life identity.

In summary, this paper explores how the experimental context affects people’s decisions in a simple

laboratory bribery game. The intensity of cognitive dissonance evoked by engaging in a dishonest

practice is manipulated by the experimental instructions. The same experimental task is presented
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to the student subjects, but with three different instructions. Specifically, we use three treatments,
one with familiar-context instruction, one with unfamiliar-context instruction, and one with context-

free instruction. In the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment, we do not find

statistically different outcomes. This result is consistent with findings from past studies. In contrast, we
find that the student subjects in the familiar-context treatment are much less likely to engage in corrupt

activities. In addition, students who engage in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment

require more monetary compensation to justify their decisions. Findings from this paper suggest that
cognitive dissonance associated with the context is the primary factor that causes different outcomes
across the treatments. This paper provides a unified interpretation of the controversial findings from
past studies.

We do not think our results should be taken to suggest that a context-free design in economics

experiments is misguided. In fact, our belief is that

researchers should always keep the experimental design as simple as possible, but not missing any

essential element. In studies investigating whether non-monetary payoffs play a vital role in reality,

we should definitely take those factors into consideration. The corruption experiment we conduct in

this study is a good example in which cognitive dissonance is extremely important. When we try to
use a laboratory experiment to simulate corruption in the real world, it is necessary to consider how
the subjects’ pre-game experience and the context jointly affect the outcome. However, in experiments
investigating whether cognitive dissonance is not essential in real life, a context-free design might be

a better option, as it would help keep the experiment simple to understand. For example, if the desire

is to elicit a subject’s risk aversion level (in economics sense), a simple context-free design is the best
option for both the subject and the experimenter.
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2. Experimental Design and Administration

The experiment is conducted at Jianghan University (Wuhan, China) in the 2015 fall semester.

Subjects are recruited from the population of undergraduate students in the school of business. In

total, 250 undergraduates are randomly invited and participate in the experiment; 13 experiment
sessions are conducted, with either 10 subjects or 20 subjects in each. Sessions last 60 minutes on

average (including check-in and payment processing). All the sessions are conducted with computerbased materials. The experimental program is developed using z-tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made
Economic Experiments, Urs Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects earn “points” (the fictitious experimental

currency) through the experiment. At the experiment’s conclusion, subjects are paid 1 RMB (=0.16 US
dollar) for every 100 points they earn. The subjects are paid their earnings privately and in cash. The

average earnings were 30 RMB (including 5 RMB show-up fee). In summary, the experiment consists
of two parts: a simple bribery game and a short questionnaire asking about subjects’ decisions and
reasoning in the game. In addition to the laboratory bribery game, we conduct an independent attitude
survey to measure people’s attitude toward corruption in each context.

The Laboratory Bribery Game
In the experiment, we use a simple laboratory bribery game to simulate a scenario in which corrupt

activities may occur. Ten subjects make up a group. In each group, 5 people play as potential bribers
(player1 below), the other 5 people play as potential bribees (player2 below). Each player2 allocates

1000 points among the 5 player1s. According to the game rules, player2 shall splits the 1000 points
equally, allowing each player1 to earn 200 points. In addition, each player1 is randomly paired with

one player2 to play the game in pairs. The two anonymous subjects in a pair interact with each other
 At Jianghan university, 30RMB is approximately the cost of 5 one-person meal in student dinning hall.
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over 15 periods.

At the beginning of each period, each player1 receives 200 points as an initial endowment. Player2

has no endowment. Player1 first decides whether to make a private transfer to the player2 in his or

her pair. If the decision is to transfer, the subject must specify an integer in the range from 1 to 200
points. Following that decision, player2 decides whether to accept or reject the bribe. If accepting it,
then the amount offered is deducted from player1’s account and added to player2’s account. If player2

rejects the bribe, then both players’ accounts remain unchanged. Last, player2 decides how to allocate
the 1000 points. If abiding by the game rules, then each player1 earns 200 points. If violating the
game rules, then the player1 in the pair earns 1000 points, and the others earn nothing. After all the
allocation decisions have been made, player1 seeks feedback on how many points were received from
each player2. Thus, player1 can infer whether or not corrupt activities exist in the group. Since corrupt
activities often impose non-trivial negative externalities on other society members, it is reasonable to

let the subjects know what happens around them. The subjects will never know the identities of the
others in the experiment.

The game is repeated for 15 periods. At the end of period 15, all the subjects are assigned to a new

role and then paired with a new partner to play the game for another 15 periods. During the iterations,
a pair of subjects is identified as a “foul” if any offer from player1 is accepted by player2. By the end of

the experiment, a lottery is played out to decide whether to punish the subjects who violated the game
rules. With a probability of 1%, the punishment occurs: Both players’ earnings are cleared from their
accounts. The extremely low probability reflects that most corrupt activities in reality are difficult to

reveal. As a matter of fact, many corrupt activities are even unobservable. The severe penalty represents
the consequences arising from discovery of corrupt activities.
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Figure 2 depicts the extensive form of the game in each round. Player1 is the potential briber, player2

is the potential bribee. T denotes the number of points offered by player1. X and Y denote the possible
penalty for player1 and player2.

The equilibria of the game are easy to obtain. On an equilibrium path, a player2 is indifferent between

“abide by the rules” and “violate the rules,” as the determination of foul is based on the decision

regarding whether or not to accept the bribe, rather than the decision regarding points allocation.
Accordingly, player2 will play the two alternatives with the same probability (50%). Furthermore,

player2’s expected payoffs for accepting the bribe is T-Y, which is greater than 0. Therefore, player2 will

always accept the bribe being offered. Given that, the expected payoffs of a player1 who offers T points
to his or her partner is (1200-2T-2X)/2, which is lower than the expected payoffs of offering nothing

(1200/2=600). That is, not bribing is the dominant strategy for player1. In equilibrium, player1 does
Player1
transfer

No
contact

T points

(1 ≤ T ≤ 200 )

Player2

Player2
violate
the rule

accept

abide by
the rule

reject

Player2

Player2
(1000,0)

(200,0)

violate the rule: one of the
player1s earns 1000 points
follow the rule: each of the
player1s earns 200 points

abide by
the rule

violate
the rule

(200-T-X, T-Y) (1000-T-X, T-Y)

abide by
the rule

violate
the rule

(200, 0)

(1000,0)

Figure2. The extensive form of the game
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not offer a bribe to player2, and player2 violates the allocation rule with a probability of 50%.
Three treatments are conducted with the same bribery game framework as introduced above. The

treatments only vary in the experimental instructions. In the first treatment, the game is presented
as a scholarship allocation scenario in a college (familiar context treatment below). In the second
treatment, the game is presented as a competitive bidding scenario among firms (unfamiliar-context

treatment below). In the third treatment, the game is presented in an abstract form without any specific

scenario or role (context-free treatment below). Table 3 summarizes the roles and terminology for
the alternatives in each of the treatments. To avoid potential data distortion caused by suggestive
wording10 , all the alternatives were presented with neutral terminologies in all the treatments. All

subjects are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. In total, 100 students participated in
the familiar-context treatment, 110 students in the context-free treatment, and 40 students in the

unfamiliar-context treatment. Following the bribery game experiment, the subjects then finish a short

open-ended questionnaire. In the questionnaire, the subjects report their decisions in the game, and
briefly explain their rationale behind their decisions.

The Attitude Survey
To validate the cognitive dissonance interpretation we propose here, we conduct a survey with a

separate subject pool to measure students’ attitudes toward corrupt activities in each of the contexts.

In addition to the laboratory bribery game, 90 students are randomly invited to respond to an attitude

survey. The respondents are asked to indicate their attitudes on a 7-point Likert scale toward corrupt
activities in one of the three contexts (with 30 respondents in each context). The respondents of the
attitude survey and the subjects of the laboratory bribery game come from the same college (JiangHan

University). They are very similar in age, education, and social experience. Such design allows us to
 At the Jianghan University (and perhaps many other colleges in China), the academic advisor is in charge of scholarship allocation.
10 In the Chinese language and culture, the word “bribery” is often used in an extremely derogatory sense.
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obtain measures for attitudes that are not influenced by decisions in the laboratory bribery game. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first bribery game experiment to use an independent survey to
measure cognitive dissonance level.

3. Results
Attitudes toward corrupt activities in each of the contexts.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of people’s attitudes toward corruption in each of the contexts.

Keep in mind that the respondents of the attitude survey did not participate in the laboratory bribery
game, so their responses are not influenced by the game. In total, 90 students respond to the attitude
survey, 30 in each context. According to the result, the mean scores toward corrupt activities are
2.793 and 2.414 for player1 and player2. That is, most of the students hold negative views on corrupt

activities. These negative attitudes are amplified by the familiar (college) context among the student
Table3. The contexts and vocabulary used in the three treatments.
Treatments

familiar context

unfamiliar context

context-free

Scholarship

Profits

Points

Student

Tender

Applicant

alternative1

make a transfer

make a Transfer

make a Transfer

alternative2

no contact

no contact

no contact

Advisor

Tenderee

Granter

alternative1

abide by the rule

abide by the rule

abide by the rule

alternative2

violate the rule

violate the rule

violate the rule

Earnings
Player1’s role
Player1’s
alternatives
Player2’s role
Playr2’s
alternative
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respondents. In terms of attitudes toward player1’s bribery, the mean score is 1.57 (Std.dev.=1.30)

in the familiar-context survey, 3.85 (Std.dev.=2.05) in the unfamiliar-context survey, and 3.07 (Std.
dev.=1.78) in the context-free survey. The t-test result suggests that the mean score in the familiar-

context survey is substantially lower than that in the other two surveys (p<0.001 for both). The mean
attitude score toward player2’s corrupt activities is 1.43 (Std.dev.=1.01) in the familiar-context survey,
3.30 (Std.dev=1.98) in the unfamiliar-context survey, and 2.60 (Std.dev.=1.67) in the context-free

survey. This result indicates that the students hold the strongest negative attitudes toward player2’s
corrupt activity in the real-life-context survey (mean comparison tests: p<0.001).

As the survey respondents and the laboratory game participants are very similar in background,

we conjecture that they also share similar opinions toward corrupt activities. Thus, a student subject
in the laboratory game would experience the strongest cognitive dissonance if he or she engages in
corrupt activities in a hypothetical scholarship allocation scenario.

Additionally, no evidence suggests that the respondents’ attitudes in the unfamiliar-context survey

are significantly different than in the context-free survey (mean comparison result: p=0.1299 to

player1s’ corrupt activities, and p = 0.1535 to player2s’ corrupt activities). We then conjecture that the
Figure3. The students hold exteremely negative attitudes toward corrupt activities in the college context
Attitudes toward player1’s corrupt activities

Attitudes toward player2’s corrupt activities

Extremely Agree

7

Moderately Agree

6

Somewhat Agree

5

Not Sure

4

Somewhat Disagree

3

Moderately Disagree

2

Extremely Disagree

1

familiar
context

unfamiliar
context

context
free

familiar
context

unfamiliar
context

context
free
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students in the bribery game experiment would behave similarly in the unfamiliar-context treatment
and the context-free treatment.

Corrupt activities in the laboratory bribery game.
In general, the frequency of a player1’s bribery attempts is 31.13% in the familiar-context treatment,

39.81% in the unfamiliar-context treatment, and 41.83% in the context-free treatment. Fisher exact
test results indicate that the familiar-context treatment has the lowest bribery rate (Fisher exact

test p <0.0001 in comparison to the unfamiliar-context and p <0.0001 in comparison to the contextfree treatment). No evidence suggests that the player1’s bribery rate in the unfamiliar treatment

is significantly different than in the context-free treatment (Fisher exact test p = 0.4089). Table 4

summarizes the player1s’ behavior. In the familiar-context treatment, 36% of the individual player1s
never tried to bribe their partners; this proportion is 20% in the unfamiliar-context treatment

(significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.0480) and 17.27%
Table4. Player1s (potential bribers) in the familiar context treatment have less bribing attempts
Never offer a bribery
(attempt=0/15)

No more than one time
(attempts <=1/15)

Constantly offer bribery
(attempts >= 8/15)

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

36/100

8/40

19/110

43/100

8/40

28/110

29/100

15/40

41/110

36.00%

20.00%

17.27%

43.00%

20.00%

25.45%

29.00%

37.50%

37.27%

Table5. Player2s (potential bribees) in the familiar context treatment are less likely to violate the rule
Never violate the rule
(attempt=0/15)

No more than one time
(attempts <=1/15)

Constantly violate the rule
(attempts >= 8/15)

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

Familiar
context

Unfamiliar
context

Context
free

64/100

7/40

33/110

74/100

9/40

56/110

5/100

4/40

12/110

64.00%

17.50%

30.00%

74.00%

22.50%

50.91%

5.00%

10.00%

10.91%
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in the context-free treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact

test p=0.0017). In the experiment, some of the player1s may have selected the bribery option by
mistake (or perhaps to become familiar with the game). Among all the player1s in the familiar-context

treatment, 43% made bribery attempts no more than 1 time (out of 15 periods); this number is 20%
in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher
exact test p=0.0079) and 25.45% in the context-free treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-

context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.0055). These observations indicate that the player1s in the
familiar-context treatment are much less likely to bribe their partners.

We then compare the outcomes in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment.

We do not find any significant differences (proportion of subjects who never offer bribe: p=0.8922;
proportion of subjects who offer a bribe no more than 1 time: p=0.478; proportion of subjects who
constantly offer a bribe: p =1.0). This result is consistent with Abbink et al. (2006).
Table6. Corruption is less likely to happen in the familiar context treatment.
Corruption never happened (no bribery, no violation)
Familiar context

Unfamiliar context

Context-free

990/1500

305/600

863/1650

66%

50.83%

53.20%

Table7. The familiar context treatment has the higest bribery rejection rate.
The player2 rejected the bribery from the player1
Familiar context

Unfamiliar context

Context-free

381/467

159/251

507/657

81.58%

63.35%

77.12%

Table8. In the familiar context treatment, interactions initiated by the player2 are rare.
The player2 violate the rule without any bribery from the player1
Familiar context

Unfamiliar context

Context-free

43/1033

44/349

130/993

4.16%

12.61%

13.09%
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Table 5 summarizes the frequencies of the player2s’ corrupt activities (i.e., violate the rule when

allocating resources). The proportion of subjects who never violate the rule is 64% in the familiarcontext treatment and 17.50% in the unfamiliar-context treatment. These two proportions are

significantly different (Fisher exact test p<0.0001). The player2s in the familiar-context treatment are
also much more likely to abide by the rules than those in the context-free treatment (Fisher exact test

p<0.0001). The proportion of subjects who never violate the rule is 17.50% in the unfamiliar-context

treatment and 30% in the context-free treatment. Again, the difference is not statistically significant
(Fisher exact test p=0.147).

In short, the possibility of engaging in corruption is obviously, in a statistical sense, lowest in the

familiar-context treatment, for both the player1s and the player2s. Observations from the bribery

game, together with evidence from the attitude survey, suggest that the artificial familiar context
amplifies the cognitive dissonance of engaging in dishonest practices, thus preventing the student
subjects from performing unethical behavior. In addition, in line with past studies, we do not find
essential differences in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment.

Upon completion of the bribery game, all the subjects are asked to complete an open-ended survey

about their decisions and reasoning in the bribery game. According to the survey, 54% of the subjects

in the familiar-context treatment mentioned the college background. Among them, only 6% engaged
in corruption in the experiment.

We also find that the frequency of offering a bribe while playing the briber and the frequency of

violating the rules while playing the bribee are positively correlated (correlation = 0.4208, t=6.6839,
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p<0.0001). This finding indicates that corrupt behavior is likely to be related to certain aspects of
individual characteristics (such as personality traits).

Next, we examine the interactions between player1 and player2 in a pair. We find that a reciprocal

relationship between the two players is less likely to be established in the familiar-context treatment
(Table 6). Specifically, 66% of the time corrupt activity never occurs (i.e., player1 never offers his

or her partner a bribe, and player 2 never violates the rules) in the familiar-context treatment. This
percentage is 50.83% in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiarcontext treatment, Fisher exact test p <0.0001) and 53.20% in the context-free treatment (significantly

lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p <0.0001). Moreover, the player2s in

the familiar-context treatment are more likely to reject the bribery from the other person (Table 7). In
aggregate, 81.58% of the bribes from the player1 were rejected in the familiar-context treatment. This

percentage is 63.35% in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-

context treatment, Fisher exact test p<0.0001) and 77.12% in the context-free treatment (significantly

lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.075). In addition, from Table 8, we
can see that only 4.16% of the interactions are initiated by player2 in the familiar-context treatment
(i.e., player2 violates the game rules without an offer from player1). This proportion is also the lowest
among the three treatments. Again, we do not see different results in the unfamiliar-context treatment
and the context-free treatment.

To further examine whether the familiar-context is inversely related to the probability of engaging in

corruption, we perform several regression analyses. We first use ordinary least squares (OLS) models
to predict player 1’s bribery decisions (individual bribery rate) as a function of the context dummies

and other controls (regression1 to regression3 in Table 9). Following that, we provide regressions in
which player2’s violation decisions (individual violation rate) are predicted as a function of the context
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dummies and the amount of money being offered by player1 with the controls (regressions 4-6 in Table
9). In the data, we observe many subjects who never engage in any corrupt activities throughout the

whole experiment. Thus, we take player1’s bribery decision as a binary variable. That is, if a player1
Table9. Familiar context dummy negatively predict unethical behavior (OLS regression)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Player1

(6)

Player2

bribery
rate

bribery
rate

bribery
rate

violation
rate

violation
rate

violation
rate

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

-0.098***
(0.039)

not
included

-0.094***
(0.042)

-0.110***
(0.022)

not
included

-0.086***
(0.026)

--

0.016
(0.055)

0.017
(0.054)

0.056
(0.035)

--

--

--

0.055
(0.035)
--

--

male

0.225***
(0.048)

0.231***
(0.065)

0.224***
(0.048)

0.086***
(0.033)

0.119**
(0.048)

0.086**
(0.032)

Constant

0.356***
(0.027)

0.350***
(0.031)

0.351***
(0.031)

0.166***
(0.016)

0.146***
(0.018)

0.152***
(0.012)

dependent variable
model
familiar context
(treatment dummy)
unfamiliar contextand
and context-free
(treatment dummy)

(5)

unfamiliar
context
context-free

Observations

250

150

250

250

150

250

Robust S.D.

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

R-squred

0.106

0.308

0.106

0.094

0.075

0.103

Table10. Familiar context dummy negatively predict unethical behavior (Probit regression)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Player1

(6)

Player2

bribe
decision
(binary)

bribe
decision
(binary)

bribe
decision
(binary)

violation
decision
(binary)

violation
decision
(binary)

violation
decision
(binary)

Probit

Probit

Probit

Probit

Probit

Probit

-0.599***
(0.181)

not
included

-0.625***
(0.199)

-1.020***
(0.172)

not
included

-0.922***
(0.183)

--

-0.098
(0.268)

-0.096
(0.270)

0.408
(0.269)

--

--

--

0.408
(0.268)
--

--

male

0.868***
(0.266)

0.732**
(0.372)

0.867***
(0.266)

0.548***
(0.213)

0.473
(0.298)

0.548***
(0.215)

Constant

0.784***
(0.125)

0.827***
(0.148)

0.811
(0.146)

0.522***
(0.116)

0.437***
(0.137)

0.424***
(0.131)

Observations

250

150

250

250

150

250

Robust S.D.

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

R-squred

0.082

0.033

0.082

0.123

0.030

0.130

dependent variable
model
familiar context
(treatment dummy)
unfamiliar contextand
and context-free
(treatment dummy)

(5)

unfamiliar
context
context-free
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Table11. Subjects in the real-life-context treatment required more monetary compensation
Treatments

Average offer

Average accepted offer

Difference

Familiar context

43.91/200

139.57/200

95.66

Unfamiliar context

60.32/200

147.84/200

87.52

Context-free

40.50/200

108.05/200

67.51

never bribes his or her partner, it takes the value of 0; otherwise, it takes the value of 1. We then predict

this binarized bribery decision as a function of the context dummies and other controls (regressions
1–3 in Table 10). Similarly, we predict the binarized rule violation decision of player2 as a function

of the context dummies and other controls (regressions 4-6 in Table 10). As the results suggest, the

familiar-context dummy is negatively related to the probability of engaging in corrupt activities. This

effect is highly robust to changes in specification. The magnitude of the parameters is much larger
in the probit regressions than in the OLS regressions. In addition, we also find that male subjects are
more likely to engage in corrupt behavior than female subjects.

Last, we look at the bargaining between the two players in the repeated game. During the iteration,

if a player1’s bribery is rejected by a player2, then player1 can try to increase the offer to “buy” the
Figure4. Evolution of the player1’s bribery decision

The player1’s
bribery decision
0.65 (rel. frequency)

Figure5. Evolution of the player2’s rule-violation decision
The player2’s
rule-violation decision
(rel.frequency)

unfamiliar context

unfamiliar-context

0.30
0.60

context-free

context-free

0.55

0.25

0.50
0.20

0.45
0.40

0.15

0.35
0.30

0.10

0.25
0.20

familiar context

0.05

familiar context

0.00
0	5	10	15	20	25	
			
Period

30

0	5	10	15	20	25	
			
Period

30
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partner. We use the difference between the average offered bribe and the average accepted bribe to

capture the difficulty of establishing a reciprocal (yet corrupt) relationship between the two players.
According to Table 11, the player1s in the familiar-context treatment have to pay the most money to

persuade the player2s to become involved in a dishonest practice. This finding is consistent with the

prediction of cognitive dissonance theory in that the student subjects in the familiar-context treatment

require more monetary compensation (as external justification) to reduce their extremely intense

cognitive dissonance. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the evolution of the player1’s bribery decisions
(as a binary choice) and the evolution of the player2’s rules-violation decisions (as a binary choice). In

most of the 30 periods, corrupt activities are less likely to be observed in the familiar-context treatment.
Note that the subjects change their roles and re-pair with new partners after period 15. Figure 3 and
Figure 4 depict the aggregate pattern of the subjects’ choices.

4. Conclusion and future direction

It has become standard for economists to present experimental tasks using context-free instructions.

A large number of past studies has looked at whether variations in the experimental contexts influence

people’s decisions, with mixed evidence being reported and little insight being provided to explain the
underlying mechanism.

In the current study, we propose that the experimental context affects the subject’s behavior through

the channel of cognitive dissonance, defined as the aversive state when people engage in a dishonest
practice that is inconsistent with their positive self-concept. We show that the experimental context

and subjects’ pre-game experience jointly influence decision making in a systematic and predictable
51

way. Our findings, along with indirect evidence from past studies, indicate that a familiar decisionmaking context leads subjects to link the experimental task with their self-concept. Consequently, the

familiar context amplifies subjects’ emotional stress of engaging in corruption and makes them less
likely to behave unethically.

We conduct a simple laboratory bribery game in which the intensities of cognitive dissonance

are controlled. Specifically, we carry out three different treatments: a familiar-context treatment
(associates with the most intense cognitive dissonance), an unfamiliar-context treatment, and a
context-free treatment. We find that corrupt activities are substantially fewer in the familiar-context

treatment than in the other two treatments. In addition, we find that the student subjects in the

familiar-context treatment require more external justification (monetary compensation) to reduce the
dissonance evoked by their corrupt activities. Moreover, we replicate the results from past studies: In
the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment, we do not find essential differences
in the subjects’ behavior.

We do not think our results should be seen as a whole rejection of the context-free design approach.

Instead, the point we are trying to make is that we should always keep our experimental design as
simple as possible, but not simpler. In reality, moral obligation and the positive self-concept play a

vital role in corruption decision making; therefore, it is important to simulate these non-monetary
payoffs while conducting laboratory experiments. In experiments in which self-concept and cognitive
dissonance are not an essential consideration, using a context-free design is more advantageous.

Our research contributes to one of the persistent, but still far from settled questions on experimental

methodology: What is the right way to present experimental tasks to subjects? The experiments
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considered here are intended to be a step in the direction of testing the role of context in economics
experiments. Despite most experimental studies being conducted using context-free instructions,

many researchers have argued that such practice impairs the external validity of results generated
from laboratory experiments (e.g., Loomes, 1999), especially when researchers simulate situations
that are relevant to real-life problems. To the best of our knowledge, very few attempts have been made

to verify the above concern. To address this question, we will track each subject in our experiment

through his or her entire college career. In addition, we will try to take the subjects’ personality traits
into consideration. Hopefully, we will be able to provide more solid evidence of the impact of context
by looking at how people’s decisions in the laboratory experiment relate to their decisions in reality.
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Appendix: The attitude surveys and the experimental instructions
Translated attitude survey: familiar context

Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below.

Imagine a scholarship allocation scenario in a college. In total five students applied the same
scholarship. There are 1000 dollars available in the award pool. All the student applicants are equally
qualified. According to the college policy, the dean shall split the $1000 dollars among the five
applicants. That is to say, each of the applicants shall receive an award of $200.
However, prior to the scholarship allocation decision, one of the five students talked to the college
dean, sent him a gift that worth $200 (secretly and privately). As return, the dean announced that
student as the only person who won the scholarship, distributed all $1000 to her. All other applicants
earned nothing. The interaction between the student and the dean will not be discovered by others.
Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the
STUDENT and the DEAN’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be completely
honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you submit will
be completely confidential.
For the STUDENT:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

For the DEAN:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

You are: Male Female

Translated attitude survey : unfamiliar context

Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below.

Imagine a public bidding scenario in the electronic construction industry. In total five firms
submitted bids for the same project. The project will generate a profit of 1000 points (the fictitious
currency in this scenario). All the firm applicants are equally qualified. According to the industry
regulation, the tenderee shall let the five bidders to cooperate on the project, each of them shall
receive a profit of 200 points (1/5 of the 1000 points).

However, prior to the final decision, one of the five bidders talked to the tenderee, sent him a gift that
worth 200 points (secretly and privately). As return, the tenderee announced that bidder as the only
firm who won the bid. Consequently, the winning bidder earned all the 1000 points. All other bidders
earned nothing. The interaction between the firm and the tenderee will not be discovered by others.
Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the TENDER
and the TENDEREE’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be completely
honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you submit will
be completely confidential.
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For the Tender:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

For the TENDEREE:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

You are: Male Femal

Translated attitude survey : context free

Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below.

Imagine a game where people allocate Points (the fictitious currency in the game). There are five
applicants and one granter. 1000 points will be distributed among 5 applicants. All the applicants are
equally qualified. According to the game rule, the granter shall split the 1000 points among the five
applicants. That is to say, each of the applicants shall receive an award of 200 points (1/5 of the 1000
points).
However, prior to the final decision, one of the five applicants talked to the granter, sent him a gift
that worth 200 points (secretly and privately). As return, the granter announced that applicant as
the only person who won the award. Consequently, that applicant earned all the 1000 points. All
other applicants earned nothing. The interaction between the applicant and the granter will not be
discovered by others.

Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the
APPLICANT and the GRANTER’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be
completely honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you
submit will be completely confidential.
For the APPLICANT:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Not Sure

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Moderately
Agree

7
Extremely
Agree

For the GRANTER:
1
Extremely
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

You are: Male Female
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Translated experimental instruction (familiar context as a sample)

Experiment Instruction
Welcome to the decision-making lab of the Jianghan University of China. The purpose of this experiment is to
study how people make decisions in a social interactive situation. If you pay attention and make good decisions,
you may earn a considerable amount of money. Just for showing up, you have earned 5RMB. All earnings for
today’s tasks will be in addition to the 5RMB. You will earn “Points” through the experiment. At the conclusion
of the experiment, you will be paid 1RMB for every 100 points you earned. The more points you earn the more
monetary payment you can get. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings privately and in
cash. You will not be paid if you leave before you conclude the experiment. For the remainder of this experiment,
please refrain from any communication with other participants. Please put away your cell phones.
In the first part of the experiment, we will simulate a scholarship allocation scenario. There are two roles in the
experiment:
1. Student (apply for scholarship)
2 .Academic advisor (allocate the scholarship)

Each participant in the experiment will be randomly assigned with one of the two roles. 10 participants will
make up of a group. In each group, there are 5 students and 5 academic advisors. Each student applies for 5
different scholarships (scholarship A to scholarship E). Each academic advisor is in charge of allocating one
of the 5 scholarships. In addition, each student will be randomly paired with an academic advisor. Prior to the
scholarship allocation decision, the two participants in a pair can interact with each other.

The rules for scholarship allocation:
•
Each academic advisor will distribute 1000 Points among the 5 student applicants.
•
Each student applicant may face three different outcomes: Full reward (1000 points), partial reward
(200 points), and no reward (0 point).
•
In addition, we ASSUME all the applicants are the same qualified.
•
According to the college policy, all the applicants shall receive the same amount of award (partial
award, 200 points)
•
At the beginning of each round, the student will receive 200 points as initial endowment. The advisor
does not have initial endowment.
Introduction to the STUDENTS:
If your role is the STUDENT, then you can imagine that you have applied five different scholarships. Meanwhile,
you have the opportunity to contact with one of the academic advisors who are in charge of the scholarship
allocation. The first decision you need to make, is whether or not to contact the academic advisor. For example
(see the picture below): student3 have applied 5 different scholarships. In addition, she may transfer a certain
amount of points (1-200) to the academic advisor who will allocate the rewards of scholarship C, in the hope
that to earn the full reward (1000 points).
If you decide “do not contact the advisor”, then you have no other decisions to make in this round. Please wait
for the scholarship allocation outcome.
If you decide to “contact the advisor”, then you will make your second decision: transfer a certain amount of
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points to the advisor. You will specify an integer of the range from 1 to 200 points. After your transfer decision,
please wait for the scholarship allocation outcome. When all the scholarships have been allocated, you will see
the feedback on how much reward you received from each of the scholarships.

Introduction to the ACADEMIC ADVISOR:
If your role is the ADVISOR, you will allocate 1000 points among 5 student applicants. At the beginning of
each round, one of the students may contact with you and transfer some points to you. Based on the student’s
decision, you may see one of the two outcomes: (1) the student has contacted me, and have transferred some
points to me; or (2) the student has decided not to contact me.
If the student has contacted you, and has transferred some points to you, then you will make a selection between
“I accept the transfer” and “I reject the transfer”. If you accept the transfer, then the amount of offered will be
deducted from the student’s account and then added to your account. If you reject the offer, then both you and
the student’s accounts will remain unchanged. If the student has decided not to contact you, then you will make
the allocation decision directly (see examples below).
Next, you will allocate the 1000 points scholarship among the 5 students. Keep in mind that all the students are
equally qualified. According to the college policy, you shall split the 1000 points, and allocate 200 points to each
student. However, you can also violate the college policy, let the student in your pair earn all the 1000 points,
and the other students earn nothing. In short, no matter what decision has been made by the student, you
always need to make a selection between two options: (1) abide by the rule, let each student earns 200 points;
or (2) violate the rule, let one student earns 1000 points, and the other students earn nothing. After that, the
experiment will move to the next round.
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Experimental Procedure:
The game will be repeated 30 rounds. From round1 to round 15, you will play the game with a fixed partner. At
the end of period 15, all the participants will be assigned to a new role, and then be paired with a new partner
to play the game for another 15 periods.
How you will be paid:
At the conclusion of the experiment, four rounds will be randomly selected, two from round1-round15, and the
other two from round15 to round30. The randomly selected round will determine your earnings.

Punishment:
During the experiment, a pair of subjects will be identified as “foul” if any offer from the student was accepted by
the advisor. By the end of the experiment, a lottery will be played out to decide whether to punish the subjects
who are foul. With a probability of 1%, the punishment occurs: both participants’ earnings are cleared from
their accounts.
In the second part of the experiment, you will complete a short survey independently.

Survey questions after the bribery game:
(1) When you were playing the STUDENT in the experiment, have you ever contacted the advisor?
(2) Why or why not?

(3) When you were playing the ADVISOR in the experiment, have you ever violate the rule when allocating the
scholarship?
(4) Why or why not?
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Essay 3
The Premium for being a Nice Person: Agreeableness
and Career Success Level in the Initial Career Stage

1. Introduction

It has been widely accepted that people’s early career stage achievement and success dramatically

affect their careers later in life. Previous studies have shown that employees who are very successful

early on are at a distinct advantage in achieving later career success (Dreher & Bretz, 1991). In
recent decades, more and more research has reported that individual personality traits play a vital

role in determining labor market outcomes (Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Ng et al, 2005; Semykina and
Linz, 2007; Rode et al, 2008; Judge et al, 2012.). Furthermore, many empirical studies have found that
individual career achievement is jointly influenced by cognitive abilities, networking, and personality

traits (Mueller and Plug, 2006). Most of these studies have placed emphasis on people’s mid-term

career performance and outcome. We still know very little about how personality traits associate with

early career achievement. Rode et al. (2008) found that factors that determine early career success
differ from those related to achievement in one’s mid-term career. In this study, we explore the link

between personality traits and early career success. In particular, we pose the question regarding how
agreeableness as a personality trait affects people’s salary and career satisfaction level in the initial
stages of one’s career.
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Rich literature has found evidence that suggested that personality characteristics affect people’s

income and career development decisions in systematical ways. For example, the literature suggested
that agreeableness is negatively associated with people’s salary and promotions. These negative

correlations have been repeatedly observed in many studies. (Ng et al., 2005; Nyhus and Pons, 2005;
Mueller and Plug, 2006; Smykina and Linz, 2007; Rode et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2012). Simply put,
personality psychologists define agreeableness as the tendency to be an altruistic and trustworthy

person. People who score high on agreeableness are often considered to be team players, straightforward,
and even self-sacrificing. These characteristics often negatively affect people’s earnings and promotion

opportunities. Nyhus and Pons (2005) proposed that agreeable people are poorer wage negotiators
and have an egalitarian attitude toward promotion opportunities and payment. Conversely, lessagreeable persons are often considered to be assertive and aggressive, and such characteristics help

them earn advantages in their careers. However, all of these studies examined how agreeableness

affects the development of people’s career after several years. We think that the mechanism through
which agreeableness affects the early-stage labor market outcome many differ from those traits that
determine career development in later years. In the very beginning stages, there might be a premium

for being a nice person. The first reason is that the advantage of being disagreeable might become

more and more salient in later years, as it affects the way people interact with others. However, when

an employer tries to make a hiring decision, she might prefer to have a colleague who is easy to get

along with. Agreeable person may have gained some advantage during the interview progress. The
second reason is that some graduates may begin with an internship at a company, then eventually be

hired by the company as a full-time employee. During the internship experience, the agreeable person
may entice her future colleagues to feel that she is a wonderful person to work with. Consequently, an
agreeable person could be more likely to find a good job where she had an internship.
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Another branch of literature looked at the effect of the interaction between personality traits and

gender, as gender wage inequity is a common and persistent issue in many countries. This inequity

often happens at the starting point of career path. This phenomenon is also observed in the Chinese
Labor Market (Dong and Zhang, 2009; Shen and Deng, 2008; Zhang, Han, Liu, and Zhao, 2008). Judge

et al. (2012) showed that agreeableness affects income differently based on the gender of the worker.
Specifically, they found that the pay gap between agreeable and disagreeable males is significantly larger

than the gap between agreeable and disagreeable females. In other words, males receive rewards for
being disagreeable, but this benefit is minimal for females. The study by Judg et al. (2012) suggested
the importance of looking at how gender and personality characteristics jointly affect earnings. In this

paper, we propose that gender moderates the effect of agreeableness on career success. In Chinese
culture, the social norm usually conceives females as agreeable and males as less agreeable. An

individual whose personality is in conformance with his/her gender role might be appreciated within
the labor market. Thus, we hypothesize that there is a premium for being an agreeable person, and
females benefit from this premium more than males.

According to economics literature, people’s labor market success is often solely defined by income.

Higher income indicates better achievement. Yet we consider income to only reflect one part of the
story. Psychologists and researchers in managerial science have pointed out that positive psychological

outcomes are also important for one’s career development (Gutteridge, 1973; Judge et al., 1995;
Seibert et al., 1999; Judge et al., 1999). In particular, when people enjoy their jobs, they can be more
productive, more positive, and most importantly have better expectation for the future. Therefore,

we consider people’s subjective rating on job-satisfaction level as another indicator of career success.
In this study, we will measure career success using both starting salary and subjective rating on jobsatisfaction level.
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2. Data and Variable Measures

2.1. The Dataset
This paper utilizes a unique data set generated by the Career Development Center (CDC) of JiangHan

University in China. The data was collected from over 4192 Chinese young adults who recently

graduated from a local college (JiangHan University). The survey was conducted in May 2015. This
data set includes a rich set of usually labor-market and demographic variables. Most importantly, it
includes information on the personality trait of agreeableness.

The survey was conducted at two different time points. The first part of the survey was conducted

during the students’ senior year. It contained questions about the respondents’ expectations on their
future job. For example, it measured the students’ expectations on their ideal occupation, working

industry, and starting salary. The second part of the survey was conducted six months after the

participants’ graduation. It contained questions about the respondents’ current working situation
(current wage, current job satisfaction level, etc.). Unfortunately, some of the information and variables

are missed due to administrative reasons. The most important information we do not gather includes
the respondents’ GPA in school and their current working industry and occupation.

A total of 5000 online-survey invitations were sent out, and of these, 4192 students returned the

survey for a response rate of 83.84%. Among all of the respondents, 54,72% of them are female. The
average income is 2431.87 RMB/month. According to a recent survey conducted by the Statistics

department of Hubei Providence, the average starting salary for students in Hubei providence is 2653
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RMB/month.

2.2. Measurement

2.2.1. Agreeableness
From the psychology literature, the Big Five model has been the most commonly used method to

describe personality. The Big Five model of personality suggests that there are five dimensions to

personality: neuroticism, extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness.
The results from numerous studies have shown that measures for personality traits using the Big
Five model have convincing reliability and validity. Since it is unusual to have a data set that contains

variables that are of interest to both labor economists and personality psychologists, we have found

few studies that incorporate personality traits into economics research. The personality survey we
used in this study is a subset of the standard International Personality Item Pool (IPIP). It contains

three questions regarding people’s agreeableness level. These questions are highly internally

consistent (scale reliability coefficient = 0.8362). The mean value of this agreeableness measure is
4.923 (compared with a mean value of 4.97 from the literature). In addition, we find that, in our sample,
females have a higher average value (mean = 0.522) on agreeableness than males (mean = 0.457). This

observation is consistent with the findings from the psychology literature (McCrase and Costa, 1987;
Goldberg, 1999).

2.2.2. Career Success
In this paper, we use two variables as indicators of career success. The first variable is current

salary level, which is the most commonly used measure of career success in economics literature. In
the sample, the mean value of the current salary level is 2431.86 RMB per month. Since most of the
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Percent

respondents in the sample graduated from college during summer 2015, the current salary level in

agreeableness

Job Satisfaction

the report is effectively the payment of the first job in their career. In addition, there is a difference
between the current wages of males and females. In our sample, the average monthly income of females
is 2377.45, which is significantly lower than the average monthly income (2503.10) of males (t test

result p = 0.01). This observation is consistent with findings from past studies (Rawski and Zhang,
1999; Gustafsson, 2000; Liu, Meng, and Zhang, 2000; chen and ge, 2012). Moreover, since part of the
survey was conducted during the students’ senior year in college, we pose a question on their expected
wage. The average expected monthly earnings for females is 3767.61 and is 3887.35 for males. There
is no statistical difference between these two values (t-test result p =0.087).

The second career-success indicator is subjective job satisfaction level. The exact question read as

follows: “How satisfied are you with your current job?” The respondent rated their responses on a
6-point scale, with higher scores reflecting a higher satisfaction level. From our sample, the average

score of the current job satisfaction level is 2.88 (s.d.=1.244). In terms of gender difference, we find
that females indicate a higher job satisfaction level than males. The average job satisfaction levels for

females and males are 2.94 and 2.81, respectively. These two values are statistically different from
each other (t test result p = 0.0006).
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3. Method

To estimate the effect of agreeableness on early career success, we estimate two models. The first

model is a usual semi-logarithmic model:
			
		

(1)

Ln(Current Wage)=AG .α+X.β+u

Where Ln(Current Wage) is the natural logarithm of monthly income, AG is the measurement for

agreeableness, X is a row vector of individual characteristics, and u is the error term. In the vector

of observed characteristics, the included variables are healthy condition, major in college, expected
working occupation, and expected working industry.

Hypothesis 1: keeping other things equal, individuals with higher agreeableness receive higher starting
salary than individuals with lower agreeableness.

The second model concerns about people’s job satisfaction level.
			

(2)

S=AG.α+X.β+w.δ+ u

Where S is the discrete measurement of job satisfaction level. Please keep in mind that higher score

on S indicate the individual is more satisfied with her current job. Another important independent

variable is whether the current job matches with the respondents’ interests. The respondent answered
this question on a 6-point likert scale, where higher score means better match. In addition to the
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agreeableness measurement and other individual characteristics, we also put the individual’s income
on the right hand side (w), as it might be an important predictor of the job satisfaction level.

Hypothesis 2: keeping other things equal, individuals with higher agreeableness are more satisfied
with their current job.

4. Results

Table 1 summarized the correlations among the key variables. From table1, we learned that the wages

people actually earned (current wage) is significantly related with their expected wages (r = 0.157,

p<0.01). This observation indicates that most people have a reasonable expectation on their earnings.
Moreover, current wage is also significantly related with gender (r=-0.039, p=0.021), indicating that

Table1. Correlation Between the Key Variables
female respondents earned less than males. This observation is also consistent with findings from the

gender wage gap literature. In addition, current wage is also significantly related with agreeableness
(r = 0.036, p=0.032). We also find that agreeableness is positively related with female gender, and

this phenomenon have been consistently observed in past studies. However, we find no significant
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relationship between wages and job-satisfaction level.
We start our regression by estimating the effect of agreeableness with self-reported healthy condition

as the only control variable. Column (1) to (3) in table 2 reported the regression results for the total,
Table2. Agreeableness Positively Affect Starting Salary for Women

Table3. Agreeableness has Marginal Positive Effect on Job Satisfation Level
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male and female samples. We then add the respondents’ college majors, expected working industries
and expected working occupations as control variables. Results are summarized in column (4) to (6).

According to table2, we learn that the effect of agreeableness is positive and statistically significant to
female. This effect is robust to change of model specifications. However, we find no such effect for the
male sample.

Our hypothesis 1 is true for the female sample, but not for the male sample. One reason agreeableness

only has impact on women’s starting salary may be due to the gender stereotypes in the workplace. In

Chinese culture, people often define female stereotype of being agreeable and humble. The employers

(or potential employers) may appreciate individuals who conforming to this stereotype, especially

during an internship period or an interview experience. Oppositely, male stereotype is often defined
as less-agreeable and assertive. From our sample, the males are not rewarded of being agreeable.

We then test the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction level using model (2). We start the

analysis with wage, self-reported health condition, and interest match as the control variables. Results
for the total, male and female samples are summarized in column (1) to (3) in table3. We then add

in the respondents’ college majors, expected working industries and expected working occupations.
Results are summarized in column (4) to (6). According to table3, we see that self-reported health
condition has a positive effect on job satisfaction level. In addition, we observe that interest match
has the strongest prediction power on job satisfaction level. This result makes intuitive sense to us,

because one must enjoy her job much better when she feels that her interest and ability is match with
the job. However, we only find agreeableness has an effect on the total sample in a model with fewer

controls. This effect is not robust to changes of model specifications. When we add in majors, expected
occupations, and expected working industry into the model, we find job-satisfaction level cannot be
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explained by agreeableness.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we test whether the personality trait of agreeableness could be taken as a predictor of

early career success. Past studies have investigated if agreeableness affects career success for mature
managers and established employees. Few studies have looked at how it may influence new hired
employees who are at the initial stage of career.

Researchers in managerial science have pointed out that career success should be decomposed

into two dimensions: extrinsic success based on objective indicators and intrinsic success based on
subjective indicators. In most past economics studies, career success was solely defined by income,

which is an objective indicator. In this paper, we use two different variables to measure one’s career
success. The first variable is monthly income, which is commonly used in economics studies. It could
be seen as an extrinsic indicator of career success. The second variable is subjective job-satisfaction
level, which could be taken as an intrinsic measure for career success. According to our data, these two

measures are independent from each other. That is to say, higher income does not necessarily predict
higher job-satisfaction level.

We also find that agreeableness has a positive effect on the female respondents’ starting salary.

This effect is highly robust to change in model specifications. From past studies, we learned that

cognitive ability was positively related to income (Ng el al.,2005). Our result here suggests that noncognitive ability also plays a vital role in determining labor market outcome. In addition, we find that
agreeableness positively related with subjective job-satisfaction level. However, this result is not
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robust to changes in model specifications. When we add the respondents’ major as a control variable,
the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes negligible and not statistically significant. This

result might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing a major. Further examination is required to
explore this possibility.

This study has several limitations. First of all, most of the variables in the dataset are self-reported

measure. The respondents might have made some mistakes while answering those questions, no
matter intentionally or unintentionally. Secondly, due to administrative reasons, some of the variables
of interest are missed from our dataset. For example, we do not have the respondents’ current working

industry and occupation. We will try to recover these variables when we re-survey the respondents.
Thirdly, Since the data were collected from a local university in China, we are concerned about the

generalizability of the results. Although the students in JiangHan University may represent their
cohorts to some extent, we shall always be cautious to generalize these results to other populations.

Finally, in our analysis we only have personality measure on the agreeableness dimension. Although

such measure is reasonable given the results reported in the literature, our argument would be more
convincing if we could have a complete personality measure on all the five dimensions. To achieve

this goal, we plan to track and to resurvey the respondents for at least three years. Availability of
longitudinal data on individual’s working industry, career development, and personality traits would
be helpful.
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